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Abstract
Since social security involves several individual parameters, in recent years
considerable attention has been focused on the impact these parameters on
pension and social security systems. The literature on pensions has long been
highlighting concerns that public Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) pension systems
will turn out to be unsustainable in the long run and are a concern for most
countries around the world, from the industrialised nations to the developing
countries. The common trend in responses to what is a pensions crisis is a wave
of parametric pension adjustments during the last years. These parametric
reforms include, among others, changes in the contribution ceilings, increases
in the retirement age, reductions in the indexation of pensions or even carrying
out a structural reform from a Deﬁned Beneﬁt pension system to a Notional
Deﬁned Contribution (NDC).
Following this process of reforming the pension system, this thesis is focused
on the most important innovation in public pension schemes over the past
years, ﬁrst on Actuarial Balancing Mechanism (ABM) in PAYGO and second
in some aspects of the Notional Deﬁned Contributions, both in a deterministic
framework. The ABM mechanism, that uses non-linear optimization models,
identiﬁes and applies an optimal path of these variables into a PAYGO system
and absorbs ﬂuctuations in longevity, fertility rates, life expectancy or any
other events in a pension system. For the NDC, the Survivor Dividend (SD),
also called inheritance gains, kept by most NDCs is analysed under diﬀerent
assumptions to calculate the maximum mortality decrease a scheme can cover
if the SD is not distributed and whether the SD is a potential solution to cover
the longevity.
The research has considerable potential impact. It addresses a clear need in
political, business, economic and societal contexts. This project also bridges
the gap between academics and policy makers for better pension’s public poli-
cies under alternative ﬁnancial and economic scenarios. As a result, it will
allow to design and assess the path of reforms in a more eﬃcient manner. Fur-
ther development will include a stochastic framework, considering stochastic
dynamic programming, robustness, sensitivity analysis and error bounds.
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Introduction
The public pension systems are usually ﬁnanced on a Pay-As-You-Go
(PAYGO) basis where pensions for retirees are paid by the contributions of
the working-age population. A successfully PAYGO system require a bal-
ance between the expenditure on pensions and the income from contributions
made by the active workers, that is known as intergenerational solidarity1, and
long-term sustainability. Recently, the evolution and forecast of the relevant
parameters involved in the provision of pension schemes are major topics of
on-going discussion for the policy and decision-making committees in many
countries, because ageing populations are exerting signiﬁcant pressures on the
public ﬁnances of virtually all countries.
Birth rates have dramatically decreased and with continuous improvements in
life expectancy due to improved health care and medical innovations, pensions
are paid over a longer time horizon, which causes great diﬃculties when the
system does not expect such improvements and this will raise serious concerns
for the sustainability of the PAYGO pension systems. The Congress of the
United States (2005) projected that, in a few decades, their Social Security
system will be paying out more in beneﬁts than it collects in taxes. This
imbalance will be growing and is expected to remain. In Europe, European
Commission (2012b) (White Paper) and European Commission (2010) (Green
Paper), shows a clear increase in life expectancy at birth for males and females
of 7.9 and 6.5 years respectively from 2010 to 2060. Additionally, the European
population aged 60+ is estimated to become almost twice as high in 2060 as
it was in the early 2000s. Moreover, in 2012, pension expenditure represented
more than 10% of GDP and this is forecast to rise to 12.5% in 2060 in the EU.
Furthermore, the recent global ﬁnancial crisis and a severe world-wide public
debt crisis have exerted additional stress on pension systems.
1Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b), deﬁne intergenerational solidarity as the willingness of
diﬀerent groups of people to participate in a common pool, sharing actual experience,
including any losses emerging. In the context of public pension systems, the concept refers
to both young and old generations.
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The common trend in responses to what is a pensions crisis is a wave of para-
metric pension adjustments during the last years in countries like France,
Greece, Hungary, Japan, Romania and Spain2. These parametric reforms
include, among others, changes in the contribution ceilings, increases in the
retirement age, reductions in the indexation of pensions or even carrying out
a structural reform from a Deﬁned Beneﬁt PAYGO pension system to a No-
tional Deﬁned Contribution (NDC) or even to a funding pension schemes. In
Latin America, for most of their history, social protection systems have been
based on a Pay-As-You-Go ﬁnance system (Rofman, Apella, & Vezza (2015)).
However, the pressure in their ﬁnance forced them to implement several re-
forms. Since the 1980’s, most of the region countries made structural reforms
replacing totally or partially their PAYGO system with programs containing
a fully funded component of individually capitalized accounts. As a result, a
reduction of expected beneﬁts and a transfer of ﬁnancial market and volatility
risk from the state to the individual happened.
Those reforms need to reach the objective of better managed and designed
pensions system. A useful way of reaching these objectives is to provide better
information on the status and ﬁnancial development of a public pension system
by means of an actuarial balance3.
Even though the information provided by the actuarial balance can help to take
better and more informed decisions, some of the countries decide not to use it,
i.e., USA, or even take some parametric reforms via emergency modiﬁcations
in legislation without compiling any balance and knowing the real situation
of the pension system. Following this suddenly changes in legislations, Vidal-
Meliá, Boado-Penas, & Settergren (2009) and Vidal-Meliá, Boado-Penas, &
Settergren (2010) propose an Automatic Balance Mechanism (ABM) that the
authors deﬁne as a set of pre-determined measures established by law to be
applied immediately as required according to the solvency or sustainability
indicator4. Its purpose, through successive application, is to re-establish the
2See Whitehouse (2009a), Whitehouse (2009b), OECD (2012).
3For interested readers see Settergren (2008) for Sweden and The 2015 Annual report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Funds (OASDI) (2015) for the USA
4According Knell, Kohler-Toglhofer, & Prammer (2006), the term sustainability has many
deﬁnitions, though it almost always refers to the ﬁscal policies of a government, the public
sector or the pension system. One of the most widely accepted deﬁnitions in the area of
pensions is that of a position where there is no need to increase the contribution rate in
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ﬁnancial equilibrium of PAYGO pension systems with the aim of making those
systems viable without the repeated intervention of the legislators. They argue
that there are three reasons for introducing an ABMmethod, ﬁrst, to adapt the
system to changes in socioeconomic and demographic conditions; secondly, to
create a credible institutional framework in the sense that promises of pension
payments are kept; and ﬁnally, to minimise the use of the pension system as
an electoral weapon. As examined by Turner (2009) at least 12 countries have
indexation of beneﬁts linked to life expectancy or any other kind of automatic
adjustment (For more information on ABM’s see, for instance, Turner (2007),
Turner (2009), Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009), OECD (2012), and OECD (2014)).
Another major change is what is known as Notional Deﬁned Contribution
pension schemes, ﬁrst developed about 20 years ago in countries such as Italy,
Latvia, Poland and Sweden. Other countries, Holzmann, Palmer, & Robalino
(2012), including Egypt, China and Greece are seriously considering the intro-
duction of NDCs. The NDC model retains Pay-As-You-Go state ﬁnancing but
mimics a privately funded DC plan. Workers continue to pay for today’s pen-
sioners but their contributions are also credited to notional accounts, which get
a rate of return broadly linked to earnings growth. When they retire their pen-
sion beneﬁts are based on the notional capital they have accumulated, which
is turned into annuities through a formula based on life expectancy at their
retirement age (London (2013)).
However in notional accounts, the return that contributions earn is calculated
on the basis of a macroeconomic index that tries to reﬂect the ﬁnancial health
of the system (i.e. changes in salaries, GDP growth) and not market returns.
This return is called the notional interest rate. When the individual retires,
the accumulated contributions, or notional account, are converted into a life
annuity according to standard actuarial practice. Therefore, the amount of
the initial pension depends on the mortality of the retiring cohort, potential
future pension indexation and the technical interest rate used to discount the
cash ﬂows.
Following this process of reforming the pension system, this thesis is focused
on the most important innovation in public pension schemes over the past
years, ﬁrst on Actuarial Balancing Mechanism in PAYGO and second in some
the future. On the other hand, the concept of solvency refers to the ability of a pension
scheme’s assets to meet the scheme’s liabilities indicator.
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aspects of the Notional Deﬁned Contributions, both in a deterministic frame-
work. The aim is to twofold: to design Automatic Balancing Mechanisms
to restore the liquidity and sustainability of Pay-As-You-Go pension system
based on minimizing changes in the main variables, such as the contribution
rate, normal retirement age and indexation of pensions and to analyse the
Survivor Dividend, also called inheritance gains, kept by most NDCs can be
used to cover an unexpected longevity increase.
Given the above objectives, the project will be divided in four diﬀerent chap-
ters. The ﬁrst chapter analyse to what extent the Survivor Dividend kept
by most NDCs can be used to cover an unexpected longevity increase. For-
mulas are developed under diﬀerent assumptions (constant or according to
Lee-Carter mortality improvements) to calculate the maximum mortality de-
crease a scheme can cover if the Survivor Dividend is not distributed. We also
apply the formulas using Polish, Latvian and Swedish life tables and show that
the non-distribution of the Survivor Dividend is a potential solution to cover
the longevity risk of NDCs. The second chapter designs optimal strategies,
also known as Automatic Balancing Mechanisms, using non-linear optimisa-
tion techniques to guarantee the required level of liquidity in Pay-As-You-Go
pension systems through changes in the key variables of the system, such as,
the contribution rate, retirement age and/or indexation of pensions. In par-
ticular, this method aims to keep the future percentage of growth rates of
the projections for the contribution rate, the normal retirement age and the
indexation of pensions at a minimum level using a logarithm function. The
model is studied for two interesting cases, the symmetric and the asymmetric.
Under the symmetric design, our model determines whether the contribution
rate and the age of normal retirement (and indexation of pensions) are re-
duced (increased) when the buﬀer fund has a surplus or increased (decreased)
in periods of deﬁcit. In the absence of a symmetric design any surplus is kept
by the system, so the key variables can only increase or maintain the same
level. The logarithmic cost criterion try to minimise the percentage of changes
in the variables over time instead of trying to stabilise them around an initial
set value, as in the case of using a quadratic function. However, the choice
of a logarithmic function present some weaknesses for the symmetric design
as the percentage of change could the positive or negative. The optimisation
(minimisation) problem will try to push the variables in lower bounds of the
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constraints setting the fund in negative values. The aim of third chapter is
to design an Actuarial Balancing Mechanism to restore the sustainability of a
Pay-As-You-Go pension system. The model is adapted to diﬀerent population
structures. Expected and unexpected shocks are analysed in order to see how
a buﬀer fund absorbs these eﬀects. In the fourth chapter an alternative reform
of the Spanish contributory retirement pension system is designed based on
optimal strategies to restore liquidity through changes in the key variables of
the system (the contribution rate, retirement age and/or indexation of pen-
sions) and at the same time an assessment of the reformed Spanish system it
is done with the focus on its liquidity in the long run. Furthermore, our ABMs
can be easily generalised including more parameters and is applicable to any
PAYGO pension system.
However, in light of real-world pension systems with complex dynamics, the
introduction of a stochastic framework is necessary. Some useful techniques
for this purpose are stochastic dynamic programming, robustness, sensitivity
analysis and error bounds . These techniques are used for modelling optimi-
sation problems that involve uncertainty. The models presented in the thesis
are deterministic optimisation problems since we are assuming the parameters
are known. However in real world problems some parameters are unknown or
random.
The impact of the thesis is to bring forth an improved understanding of the
complex issues around making public policies related to pensions systems using
diﬀerent ﬁnancial and economic scenarios. It addresses a clear need in political,
business, economic and societal contexts. This project also bridges the gap
between academics and policy makers for better pension’s public policies under
alternative ﬁnancial and economic scenarios. As a result, it will allow to design
and assess the path of reforms in a more eﬃcient manner.
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Longevity Risk in Notional Deﬁned
Contribution Pension Schemes: A
Solution
S. Arnold (-Gaille), M. del C. Boado-Penas and H. Godínez Olivares1
Notional deﬁned contribution pension schemes (NDCs) aim at reproducing the
logic of a ﬁnancial deﬁned contribution plan under a pay-as-you-go framework.
Of particular interest is how the accumulated capital of a deceased person is
used when the death occurs prior to retirement. While in most countries this
accumulated capital (called survivor dividend, SD) is kept by the scheme, in Sweden
it is distributed among the same cohort survivors. This chapter aims to analyse
to what extent the SD kept by most NDCs can be used to cover an unexpected
longevity increase. We develop formulas under diﬀerent assumptions (constant
or according to Lee-Carter mortality improvements) to calculate the maximum
mortality decrease a scheme can cover if the SD is not distributed. We also
apply the formulas using Polish, Latvian and Swedish life tables and show that the
non-distribution of the SD is a potential solution to cover the longevity risk of NDCs.
Keywords: notional deﬁned contribution; longevity risk; pay-as-you-go; public
pensions; Lee-Carter Model; retirement.
1.1 Introduction
Retirement systems across the world are undergoing major reforms in order
to adapt to continuously changing economic and demographic factors. Among
these major changes is what is known as notional deﬁned contribution pension
1This chapter is based on the paper ‘Longevity Risk in Notional Deﬁned Contribution Pen-
sion Schemes: A Solution’ by Arnold (-Gaille), Boado-Penas, & Godínez-Olivares (2016).
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice. 41 (1), 24-52.
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schemes (NDCs), ﬁrst developed about 20 years ago in countries such as Italy,
Latvia, Poland and Sweden. Other countries, Holzmann et al. (2012), including
Egypt, China and Greece are seriously considering the introduction of NDCs.2
These pension schemes are ruled by the same principle: they attempt to repro-
duce the logic of a ﬁnancial deﬁned contribution pension plan within a pay-as-
you-go framework. Pension contributions throughout the participant’s working
life are accumulated in a ﬁctive or notional account (World Bank (2005); The
Swedish Pension System (2015)). However in notional accounts, the return
that contributions earn is calculated on the basis of a macroeconomic index
that tries to reﬂect the ﬁnancial health of the system (i.e. changes in salaries,
GDP growth) and not market returns. This return is called the notional in-
terest rate. When the individual retires, the accumulated contributions, or
notional account, are converted into a life annuity according to standard ac-
tuarial practice. Therefore, the amount of the initial pension depends on the
mortality of the retiring cohort, potential future pension indexation and the
technical interest rate used to discount the cash ﬂows.
Currently, most NDC schemes are accumulating a capital that is not neces-
sarily used to ﬁnance pension beneﬁts. Indeed, when a death occurs prior to
the retirement age, the accumulated capital of the deceased person is kept by
the scheme.3 The scheme then accumulates some reserves, with no clear pur-
pose. For instance, in Italy, Latvia and Poland, this money is not used and
implicitly becomes a component of general public revenues. Speciﬁcally, in
Poland and Latvia, these revenues provide the required funding for some un-
2Interested readers in NDCs can consult, for example, Lindbeck & Persson (2003);
Williamson (2004); Börsch-Supan (2006); Holzmann & Palmer (2006); Vidal-Meliá,
Domínguez-Fabián, & Devesa-Carpio (2006); Auerbach & Lee (2009); Vidal-Meliá et al.
(2010); Whitehouse (2010); Auerbach & Lee (2011); Chłoń-Domińczak, Franco, & Palmer
(2012)
3See Holzmann & Palmer (2006) and Chłoń-Domińczak et al. (2012) for particularities of
NDCs in diﬀerent countries.
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funded insurance commitments, for example, legacy costs from the old pension
system.
Sweden, The Swedish Pension System (2015), is the only country that dis-
tributes the accumulated capital of the deceased person among the survivors
of the same birth cohort.4 In Sweden, this capital is known as inheritance
gains, but it can also be called the “survivor dividend”.5 The notional account
of each surviving individual increases then faster and thus the pension ben-
eﬁts paid by the system from the retirement age are higher. In Sweden, the
system is then actuarially fair: the present value of the total contributions is
equivalent to the present value of the total beneﬁts.
As for any pension schemes, life insurance companies and many other institu-
tions, NDC schemes are facing challenges due to an increasing longevity. The
longevity risk is often described as having two components, the individual and
the aggregate. The ﬁrst, called idiosyncratic risk, refers to random ﬂuctuations
around an expected value and is due to uncertainty in an individual’s lifetime.
Insurance companies reduce this risk by insuring a suﬃciently large number
of persons. The second component is a systematic risk, that is, a systematic
deviation from the expected lifetime due to unexpected mortality improvements,
Gaille (2012). See also Stallard (2006). Therefore, in the case of a life annu-
ity with guaranteed beneﬁts, individuals would tend to systematically outlive
company savings (also called mathematical reserves). To manage this system-
atic risk, the life insurance business is currently either (1) transferring the risk
to another party or (2) retaining the risk. Risk transfer can be performed
4The survivor dividend is only distributed to surviving contributors and therefore works
diﬀerently from the lottery in the historical tontines where, as investors die, their shares
are forfeited, with the entire fund going to the last surviving investor. For more details on
tontines, see Forman & Sabin (2015).
5Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014). For an extended version that includes population
growth, see Vidal-Meliá, Boado-Penas, & Navarro-Cabo (2015).
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through reinsurance or securitisation.6 However, Maurer et al. (2013); Olivieri
& Pitacco (2008),reinsurance is usually expensive and reinsurers are not willing
to insure systematic risks regarding the overall insurance/reinsurance market.
Capital market instruments may then help in transferring the risk through,
for example, longevity bonds or mortality swaps, whose payments are linked
to some measure of longevity in some reference population. Currently, how-
ever, the longevity-linked product market is underdeveloped, Blake & Borrows
(2001); Cowley & Cummins (2005); Maurer et al. (2013), and the age structure
of the reference population does not necessarily reﬂect the age structure of the
insured population, Hári, De Waegenaere, Melenberg, & Nijman (2008). It is
therefore questionable whether insurers would be able to purchase the required
number of these products and, even if they could, the systematic risk would not
be perfectly hedged. Many life insurers are then compelled to self-insure their
systematic risk. To do so, some insurers use natural hedging, either through a
second business line reciprocally aﬀected by mortality changes or by oﬀering
products combining both life and death beneﬁts. Since the eﬀectiveness of
natural hedging has been questioned, Gründl, Post, & Schulze (2006); Maurer
et al. (2013); Olivieri & Pitacco (2008), many insurers are reduced to setting
aside an appropriate level of funding in order to meet unexpected mortality
improvements, usually termed a buﬀer fund or solvency margin (Hári et al.
(2008); Olivieri & Pitacco (2008)). The annuity prices, Maurer et al. (2013),
are then not actuarially fair but include premiums that protect the insurer
against adverse mortality developments with a speciﬁed degree of conﬁdence.
In practice, NDC pension schemes are suﬃciently large not to be signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the idiosyncratic part of the longevity risk. However, like life in-
6Naturally, an insurance company can avoid any systematic risk by adjusting the beneﬁts
to unanticipated mortality developments (see e.g. Maurer, Mitchell, Rogalla, & Kartashov
(2013) and references therein) and thus providing a nonguaranteed life annuity.
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surers, they should take into account the systematic risk if they wish to be
sustainable in the long run. Since pension schemes usually use oﬃcial period
life tables7 to calculate the amount of the initial pension, potential future ag-
gregate longevity improvements (the systematic risk) are ignored, which can
be dangerous for the ﬁnancial sustainability of the scheme. Of all the methods
dealing with systematic longevity risk proposed in the literature and used by
the private insurance market, only conservative mortality assumptions can be
applied in NDC schemes, resulting in the inclusion of a longevity loading in
the contributions paid to the system, or passing the remaining risk on to the
government. In this line, Alho, Bravo, & Palmer (2013) proposed a method
to allocate the systematic cohort risk to the government in a transparent way
by creating an NDC bond.8 Knell (2012) was also interested in the impact
of increasing life expectancy on NDC pension schemes. He showed how the
retirement age and the notional interest rate need to be adjusted for the sys-
tem to be balanced. However, he assumed that all members of a generation
reach their cohort life expectancy and thus, no death occurs prior to the life
expectancy age. Under such a strong assumption, the survivor dividend is
ignored.
In this chapter, we are interested in analysing if the amount of the survivor
dividend is suﬃciently large to cover the aggregate longevity risk faced by
NDC pension schemes. The survivor dividend can be seen as the buﬀer fund
or solvency margin of life insurers, in the sense that the contributions paid
by the annuitants are not actuarially fair but contain a premium for unex-
pected mortality improvements. However, three important diﬀerences appear
7For example, in Italy, period tables are used with a revision every three years (Belloni &
Maccheroni (2013)), while in Sweden annual period tables are used. See Börsch-Supan
(2006) for more details.
8For a deﬁnition of NDC bonds, see Palmer (2013).
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between the two systems: (1) in life insurance business, the additional premium
is clearly meant to ﬁnance longevity improvements, while in NDC schemes, the
additional contribution is kept by the scheme, with no clear purpose; (2) life
insurers are fully funded and thus a long-time horizon perspective is required,
while NDC pension schemes are under a pay-as-you-go system and thus not
only the long-term sustainability but also the short-term liquidity of the sys-
tem is required; (3) life insurers ﬁx their buﬀer fund in order to reduce their
underfunding probability to some pre-speciﬁed level (e.g. 2.5 per cent), while
in the current analysis, the survivor dividend is given and we are rather try-
ing to assess what mortality reduction can be ﬁnanced with it. Therefore, we
ﬁrst show that if the survivor dividend is not distributed, it can be used to
ﬁnance a decrease in mortality. The maximum mortality decrease (assumed
constant over ages) that a scheme can cover is developed with an explicit for-
mula. In a second stage, the formula is adapted in order to include future
mortality decreases according to the Lee-Carter model, Lee & Carter (1992),
an internationally recognised mortality forecasting method with the property
of constant relative speed of mortality decline what allows us to simplify our
formulas. We use the life tables from three NDC countries, namely Sweden,
Poland and Latvia, and diﬀerent assumptions regarding changes in salaries9
and indexation of pensions to illustrate our model. The main conclusions are
that the survivor dividend can ﬁnance a mortality decrease of around 30 per
cent or, in some cases, an increase in the life expectancy at age 65 of more
than 3 years.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the concept
of the survivor dividend in the context of NDC pension schemes. In the subse-
9We only consider positive changes in our numerical example. Therefore diﬀerent levels of
salary growth and pension indexation are discussed.
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quent section, we develop an explicit formula to calculate the maximum mor-
tality decrease that the scheme can cover. The mortality decrease is assumed
ﬁrst to be constant over ages and second, to follow the Lee-Carter model. In
the penultimate section, we provide a numerical illustration of the eﬀects of the
non-distribution of the survivor dividend under a generic NDC scheme using
mortality tables from Latvia, Poland and Sweden. The ﬁnal section concludes
the chapter and presents possible directions for future research.
1.2 The survivor dividend in NDC pension schemes
The survivor dividend, at a speciﬁc age, is deﬁned as the portion of the account
balances of contributors resulting from the distribution of the account balances
of participants who do not survive to retirement age. In current NDC pension
schemes, Sweden is the only country that includes the survivor dividend in
the calculation of the initial pension. The formulas developed in the next sec-
tion and the resulting applications introduced in the penultimate section are
based on a model developed by Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014). Therefore,
this section summarises their key results that will be needed throughout this
chapter. These include the mathematical formulas used to calculate the initial
pension by ﬁrst considering the survivor dividend and second, ignoring the
dividend. We also introduce the following important result from Boado-Penas
& Vidal-Meliá (2014): if the survivor dividend is included in the accumulated
capital used to calculate the amount of the initial pension, the contribution
rate paid by the contributors (the credited contribution rate) and the contri-
bution rate that makes the system balanced (the balanced contribution rate)
coincide. On the other hand, when the survivor dividend is not distributed,
the credited contribution rate is higher than the balanced rate and the system
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would continuously accumulate ﬁnancial reserves. Following the above model,
we assume that: (1) the credited contribution rate c is ﬁxed over time; (2) the
contribution base10 grows at an annual rate of g; (3) the pension beneﬁts are
indexed at an annual rate of ; (4) the contributions and beneﬁts are payable
yearly in advance; and (5) the population remains constant over time.11
1.2.1 Initial pension, excluding the survivor dividend
If the accumulated survivor dividend is not included in the calculation of the
initial pension in year t for an individual reaching the retirement age, then the
amount of the initial pension, denoted P nd(xe+A;t), can be calculated as
P nd(xe+A;t) =
K nd(xe+A;t)
äxe+A;g
; (1.1)
where
Knd(xe+A;t) = c
A 1X
k=0
y(xe+k; A+k+t)(1 + g)
(A k) = c
A 1X
k=0
y(xe+k;t) (1.2)
and
xe is the entry age in the system, that is, the ﬁrst age at which a contribution
is paid;
A is the number of years during which contributions are paid and thus
xe + A represents the retirement age;
Knd(x;t) is the accumulated notional capital at time t for an individual age x,
without taking into account the survivor dividend;
10The terms contribution base and salary are used as synonyms.
11Additional details of the model are described by Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014).
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äx;g =
P1
k=0
1 + 
1 + g
k
kpx is a whole life annuity-due indexed at rate  with
a technical interest rate equal to g, for an individual age x;
kpx is the probability for an individual age x to survive up to age x+ k and
by convention 1px = px;
y(x;t) is the average contribution base at time t for an individual age x, with
y(x;1)(1 + g)
t 1 = y(x;t).
1.2.2 Initial pension considering the survivor dividend
If the accumulated survivor dividend is included in the calculation of the initial
pension for any individual who reaches the retirement age, then the amount
of the initial pension at time t, denoted P(xe+A;t), is calculated as
P(xe+A;t) =
K(xe+A;t)
äxe+A;g
=
Knd(xe+A;t) +D
ac
(xe+A;t)
äxe+A;g
(1.3)
with
K(xe+A;t) =
c
PA 1
k=0 l(xe+k; A+k+t)y(xe+k; A+k+t)(1 + g)
(A k)
l(xe+A;t)
=
c
PA 1
k=0 l(xe+k;t)y(xe+k;t)
l(xe+A;t)
(1.4)
where
Kx;t is the accumulated notional capital at time t for an individual age x,
including the survivor dividend;
Dac(x;t) is the accumulated survivor dividend at time t and age x;
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l(x;t) is the number of individuals alive at time t and age x, assuming no
growth of the population, that is, l(x;t) = l(x;1).
1.2.3 Balanced system contribution rate, including the survivor divi-
dend
According to Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014), the contribution rate paid by
the contributors c (credited contribution rate) and the contribution rate that
makes the system balanced  are equal if the survivor dividend is included in
the calculation of the pension. Indeed, we have
P(xe+A;t)
1X
k=0
l(xe+A+k;t)
h1 + 
1 + g
ik
= 
A 1X
k=0
l(xe+k;t)y(xe+k;t) (1.5)
Substituting the expression of P(xe+A;t) in Formula 1.5, it follows that
c
PA 1
k=0 l(xe+k;t)y(xe+k;t)
l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;g
l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;g = 
A 1X
k=0
l(xe+k;t)y(xe+k;t)
=) c = : (1.6)
The total value of the contributions is then equal to the total value of the
beneﬁts, and the system does not accumulate any reserves.
1.2.4 Balanced system contribution rate, excluding the survivor divi-
dend
If the survivor dividend is not distributed, then the contribution rate that
makes the system balanced, nd, can be calculated as
P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;g = nd
A 1X
k=0
l(xe+k;t)y(xe+k;t): (1.7)
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Substituting the expression for P nd(xe+A;t), we see that
c = 
ndK(xe+A;t)
Knd(xe+A;t)
=) c  nd: (1.8)
Consequently, the system continuously accumulates ﬁnancial reserves. Indeed,
by paying the contribution rate c when only a contribution nd is required
for a balanced system, savings are made. However, an assumption implicitly
made is that mortality rates are not changing over time. As it is known that
longevity is increasing over time, the following section analyses under which
conditions the accumulated reserves due to the non-distribution of the survivor
dividend can be used to cover future mortality improvements.
1.3 Explicit formulas
As demonstrated in the previous section, NDC pension schemes that do not
distribute the survivor dividend accumulate some reserves. These reserves can
be used to face some unexpected risks, such as an unexpected decrease of
mortality. Two diﬀerent scenarios are analysed. First, we assume that the
contribution base is not growing (g = 0) and the pension beneﬁts remain
constant ( = 0). Second, we allow for a constant growth of salaries (g 6= 0)
and a constant indexation of pensions ( 6= 0).
1.3.1 No growth of salaries and no indexation of pensions
This section studies three diﬀerent approaches for a mortality decrease (or
equivalently, a survival increase). The ﬁrst one considers a constant increase
in the survival rate over ages, that is, the probability of surviving at each age
increases by the same proportion a. We then look for the maximum increase
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in survival, or the maximal value of a , the system can aﬀord. Since a constant
increase in the survival rates over ages may not be reasonable compared to
past mortality improvements, the second approach uses the observed pattern
in the rate of change of past mortality rates. We allow for diﬀerent mortality
improvements by age, while imposing at the same time a constant structure
between mortality rates, that is, the structure found through the Lee-Carter
model (Lee & Carter (1992)). The maximummortality decrease the system can
cover under the restriction imposed by the Lee-Carter model is thus developed.
Finally, a much simpler approach based on improvements in life expectancy is
proposed.
Case 1: Constant improvement in the survival rates
In order to ﬁnd the maximal survival increase an NDC scheme can aﬀord,
we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd the amount the system can use to cover such longevity
increases. The total expenditure on pensions at time t, Endt , when the survivor
dividend is not included in the accumulated notional capital of the individuals
can be written as
Endt =
1X
k=0
P nd(xe+A+k;t)l(xe+A+k;t)
=
1X
k=0
P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)kpxe+A
= P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)(1 + exe+A) (1.9)
since there is no pension indexation, no growth of salaries and l(xe+A+k;t) =
l(xe+A;t)kpxe+A. Note that exe+A denotes the life expectancy at retirement age.
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However, the contributions paid to the system could cover pension beneﬁts
increased by the survivor dividend. Therefore, Et, the total expenditure on
pensions that the scheme can theoretically cover when the survivor dividend
is included, is
Et =
1X
k=0
P(xe+A+k;t)l(xe+A+k;t)
= P(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)(1 + exe+A)
= P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)(1 + exe+A) +D
ac
(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t) (1.10)
since P(xe+A;t) =

P nd(xe+A;t) + D
ac
(xe+A;t)
=(1 + exe+A)

. The NDC scheme saves
then an amount of
Et   Endt = Dac(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t) (1.11)
when the pension P nd(xe+A;t) is paid instead of the pension P(xe+A;t). Formula 1.11
represents the amount available to ﬁnance an unexpected increase in longevity.
We now consider an unexpected increase in the survival rates and its impact
on the NDC expenditure. An increase in the survival rates of a per cent at all
ages from the retirement age would result in pension expenditure Endt
Endt = P(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)
1X
k=0
(1 + a)kkpxe+A
= P(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)
1X
k=0
1
(1 + b)k
kpxe+A
= P(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;b (1.12)
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with b = (1=(1 + a))   1 < 0 and äxe+A;b representing a life annuity-due
evaluated with a negative interest rate of b. The expenditure increases then
by an amount of
Endt   Endt = P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)

äxe+A;b   (1 + exe+A)

: (1.13)
In order to ﬁnd the maximal mortality decrease the system can aﬀord, we need
to solve with respect to b the following inequality:
P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)

äxe+A;b   (1 + exe+A)
  Dac(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)
which leads to
äxe+A;b   (1 + exe+A) 
Dac(xe+A;t)
P nd(xe+A;t)
(1.14)
This inequality can be solved numerically by several environments for mathe-
matical computing.
Formula 1.14 reveals that an increase in the survivor dividend would allow the
system to aﬀord a more important mortality decrease, which is intuitive. At
the same time, if the initial amount of the pension, P nd(xe+A;t), is higher and
thus closer to P(xe+A;t), Dac(xe+A;t) would consequently be lower and the scheme
would less easily cope with a longevity increase.
Case 2: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model
The Lee-Carter model (Lee & Carter (1992)), has become a standard in mor-
tality modelling. It decomposes the logarithm of the force of mortality, that is
the instantaneous rate of mortality at a certain age x, in two components, one
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capturing the age pattern of average mortality rates and the other a common
time trend with diﬀerential impacts by age,
ln
 
(x;t)

= x + xt + (x;t) (1.15)
where
(x;t) is the force of mortality at age x, in year t;
x is the mean value over time, at age x, of the logarithm of the force of
mortality;
x is the relative speed of mortality change at age x. It reﬂects the impact
of the time trend represented by t on age, that is the higher its absolute
value, the greater the impact of mortality changes over time on age x;
t is the mortality rate trend over time;
(x;t) is the historical inﬂuence not captured by the model or, equivalently,
error with mean zero and variance 2 (homoscedasticity).
The parameters of the model can be estimated numerically through maximum
likelihood estimation, assuming that the number of deaths follows a Poisson
distribution. Additional details on the model properties and estimation proce-
dure are provided by Delwarde & Denuit (2006) or Gaille (2012). The model
was successfully applied in many countries12 and owes its success mainly to
its simplicity. Parameters are easily interpretable and forecasts are easily per-
formed. At the same time, the model presents a few weaknesses, such as the
lack of smoothness of the mortality rates across ages.13 The model has also a
12For example, Tuljapurkar, Li, & Boe (2000), Wilmoth (1996) and Lundström & Qvist
(2004).
13The pros and cons of the Lee-Carter model have been discussed in several papers; see, for
example, Booth & Tickle (2008).
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very interesting property, extremely relevant in our analysis. It assumes that
the relative speed of mortality decline at diﬀerent ages, x, is constant over
time. Therefore, once we know the general mortality decline over time, we mul-
tiply it by x in order to ﬁnd the mortality decline for age x, and thus we have
diﬀerent decreases for diﬀerent ages. This property allows us to deﬁne elegant
formulas. The ﬁrst step is then to ﬁt the Lee-Carter model to past mortality
rates in order to have an estimation of the x parameters. In a second stage,
we need to determine the maximal general mortality decline, represented by
the maximal decrease of t, an NDC scheme can aﬀord, using the x parame-
ters found in the ﬁrst stage. Formally, denote px as the current survival rates
at age x and px as the survival rates following a mortality decrease according
to the Lee-Carter model. Under constant age speciﬁc mortality rates within
bands of age and time, we can show that
px = [px]
(B^x) (1.16)
with B^x = e^x and  is deﬁned as the general mortality decrease, that is, the
decrease of t. The hat on the parameters indicates estimated values.
Using the same procedure described through Formulas 1.12-1.14 in the sub-
section “Case 1: Constant improvement in the survival rates” with a survival
increase represented by Formula 1.16, we can show that the maximal general
mortality decrease the system can aﬀord is given by the highest value of 
respecting
h 1X
k=0
kY
j=0

pxe+A+j
(B^xe+A+j)   exe+Ai  Dac(xe+A;t)P nd(xe+A;t) : (1.17)
Details are provided in Appendix A.
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Even if this inequality can easily be solved by several environments for statisti-
cal computing, Formula 1.17 can be simpliﬁed if we assume that the mortality
decrease is relatively small. Under such an assumption, we can show that
Formula 1.17 simpliﬁes to
äxe+A;LC()   (1 + exe+A) 
Dac(xe+A;t)
P nd(xe+A;t)
; (1.18)
where the subscript LC() indicates that the present value is computed with
an interest rate of  1 < yx = [1=(e( ^x^x))]   1 < 0 (See Appendix B for
details), that is, the interest rate is changing over time according to the x
parameters of the Lee-Carter model and a general mortality decrease of .
In order to ﬁnd the maximal mortality decrease the system can aﬀord, we
now need to solve Formula 1.18 with respect to . It is interesting to note
that the maximum mortality decrease that the system can aﬀord is found in
a relatively similar way when survival rates increase by a constant proportion
over all ages (section “Case 1: Constant improvement in the survival rates”,
Formula 1.14) and when the survival increase is related to the Lee-Carter
model (Formula 1.18). The diﬀerence between the two inequalities lies in the
discounting interest rate that is used. In both cases, the interest rates are
negative. However, in Formula 1.14, the interest rate is constant over time,
while in Formula 1.18, it changes.
Case 3: Life expectancy improvement at the retirement age
In the preceding sections, Formulas 1.14, 1.17 and 1.18 give a precise descrip-
tion of the longevity improvements through modiﬁed survival or mortality
rates an NDC scheme can cover, and which, to be solved, require some envi-
ronments for statistical computing. When there is no indexation of pensions
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and no salary growth, it is however possible to get a quick idea of the longevity
increase magnitude (in years) that an NDC scheme can cover. Indeed, an NDC
scheme pays at retirement age an initial pension amount of P nd(xe+A;t), while it
could theoretically pay an amount of P(xe+A;t), corresponding to a life ex-
pectancy of exe+A. If mortality decreases, the life expectancy will increase to,
for example, e”xe+A. We deﬁne e as the increase in life expectancy
e = e”xe+A   exe+A;
with
e”xe+A > exe+A;
and P ”(xe+A;t) as the pension beneﬁt paid at the retirement age corresponding
to a life expectancy of e”xe+A and including the survivor dividend. Since this
result only holds if there is no indexation of pensions and no salary growth,
Formula 1.3 simpliﬁes and we have
P ”(xe+A;t) =
Knd(xe+A;t) +D
ac
(xe+A;t)
e”xe+A
< P(xe+A;t):
As we are interested in ﬁnding the conditions under which P ”(xe+A;t) = P nd(xe+A;t),
we have
Knd(xe+A;t) +D
ac
(xe+A;t)
e”xe+A
=
Knd(xe+A;t)
1 + exe+A
: (1.19)
Using e”xe+A = e+ exe+A and solving Formula 1.19, we ﬁnd
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e =
(1 + exe+A)D
ac
(xe+A;t)
Knd(xe+A;t)
: (1.20)
Formula 1.20 represents the maximal increase in life expectancy the system can
ﬁnance. Naturally, a diﬀerent mortality pattern can reproduce the same life
expectancy. Therefore, diﬀerent age-speciﬁc mortality decreases can explain
an increase of e, with important consequences for the age structure of the
population. However, Formula 1.20 provides a straightforward way to get a
ﬁrst estimation of the longevity risk that the scheme can cover.
1.3.2 With growth of salaries and indexation of pensions
Case 4: Constant improvement in survival rates
As mentioned in the section “The survivor dividend in NDC pension schemes”,
Formulas 1.5–1.7, the total expenditure on pensions when the survivor dividend
is excluded or included are, respectively
Endt = P
nd
(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;g; (1.21)
Et = P(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;g
=
h
P nd(xe+A;t) +
Dac(xe+A;t)
äxe+A;g
i
l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;g: (1.22)
Therefore, the amount that the system saves if the pension P nd(xe+A;t) is paid
instead of P(xe+A;t) is equal to
Et   Endt = Dac(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t): (1.23)
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Formula 1.23 represents the amount available to ﬁnance an unexpected increase
in longevity. It is interesting to note that this formula is identical to Formula
1.11. Salary growth and pension indexation seem to have no direct impact
on the amount available for an unexpected increase in longevity. While this
is true for pension indexation, the growth of salaries g is directly aﬀecting
the survivor dividend, Dac(xe+A;t). This result is reasonable since Formula 1.23
represents a saved capital accumulated before any pension beneﬁts are being
paid.
If the survival rates increase by a per cent at all ages from retirement, the total
expenditure on pensions Endt becomes
Endt = P
nd
(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)
1X
k=0
h1 + 
1 + g
i
(1 + a)kkpxe+A
= P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)
1X
k=0
h1 + 
1 + g
ik
kpxe+A
= P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)ä

xe+A;g (1.24)
with  = (1 + )(1 + a)   1. The increase in survival acts as an increase in
the pension indexation rate. The pension expenditure increases then by an
amount of
Endt   Endt = P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)

äxe+A;g   äxe+A;g

; (1.25)
and the maximal mortality decrease the system can aﬀord is found by solving
with respect to  the following inequality:
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
äxe+A;g   äxe+A;g
  Dac(xe+A;t)
P nd(xe+A;t)
: (1.26)
Case 5: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model
The introduction of growth of salaries and indexation of pensions do not lead
to any particular difﬁculties, and the development introduced in the section
“Case 2: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model” is used with
no further adaptation. Formula 1.17 becomes
h 1X
k=0
1 + 
1 + g
k+1 kY
j=0

pxe+A+j
(B^xe+A+j)   äxe+A;gi  Dac(xe+A;t)P nd(xe+A;t)   1; (1.27)
while the approximation 1.18 becomes
äxe+A;LC(g;)   äxe+A;g 
Dac(xe+A;t)
P nd(xe+A;t)
; (1.28)
with the maximal general mortality decrease the system can aﬀord represented
by the highest value of  (see Appendix C for details). The subscript LC(g; )
indicates that the present value is computed with an interest rate of  x =
(1 + g)(1 + x )  1 = (1 + g)(1=(e( ^x^x))), that is, an interest rate changing
over time according to the x parameters of the Lee-Carter model, a general
mortality decrease of  and a rate of growth of the salaries of g. Formula 1.28
extends Formula 1.18 to a more general framework, since salary and pension
growth are now included. In both equations, the discounting rate of interest
changes over time. However, the discounting rate of interest  x not necessarily
negative, contrary to the discounting rate x . Indeed,  x includes the growth
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of the salaries g, which is normally positive. The growth of salaries can then
counterbalance the eﬀect of x .
1.4 Numerical illustration
This section presents the eﬀects of the non-distribution of the survivor dividend
under a generic NDC scheme using the ofﬁcial period life tables from Latvia,
Poland and Sweden. Only the observed mortality rates in these countries are
used and not the population structures by age, which are kept similar for the
three countries in order to allow some comparisons of the results.
We ﬁrst present the results, assuming no growth of the salaries and no index-
ation of pensions, based on
• a constant increase in the survival probability and the equivalent maxi-
mum mortality decrease that an NDC pension system can cover, as de-
veloped in the subsection “Case 1: Constant improvement in the survival
rates”;
• mortality decreases according to the Lee-Carter model presented in the
subsection “Case 2: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter
model”;
• the increase in life expectancy at retirement that the scheme can cover
if the survivor dividend is not distributed following the methodology
presented in the subsection “Case 3: Life expectancy improvement at
the retirement age”.
Second, we present the results, assuming growth of salaries and indexation of
pensions, based on
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• a constant increase in the survival probability (from the subsection “Case
4: Constant improvement in survival rates”);
• a mortality decrease following the Lee-Carter model (from the subsection
“Case 5: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model”).
Finally, a retrospective analysis is performed where we analyse our generic
NDC scheme to see if it could have covered past mortality decreases observed
since 1980.
The life tables are obtained from the Human Mortality Database (2014). They
contain demographic information, including the number of people alive, the
number of deaths and life expectancy for various countries. For our case stud-
ies, we use the latest available period life tables by single age for each country.14
Mortality rates are computed as the ratio between the number of registered
deaths and the number of people alive at age x. The life expectancy at birth
equals 73:72 in Latvia, 75:71 in Poland and 81:76 years in Sweden.
The salary structure is obtained from the European Union statistical ofﬁce.15
The same structure with a mean monthly salary of 2; 75216 at the beginning of
the analysis is used for the three NDC countries in order to make the results
comparable.
The model described in the sections “The survivor dividend in NDC pension
schemes” and “Explicit formulas” is applied, using the following assumptions:
(1) the entry age17 into the system is ﬁxed at 25; (2) the retirement age of
14The latest available life table for Latvia and Sweden is from 2011 and for Poland from
2009.
15Eurostat Database (2014).
16Mean monthly earnings of industry, construction and services of 25 EU Member States.
17The conclusions are similar with an entry age of 30 or 35, since mortality rates are ex-
tremely low at these ages. For instance, the mortality decrease Latvia can cover would be
aﬀected by less than 1 per cent with an entry age of 30 and less than 2 per cent with an
entry age of 35.
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the participants is 65; (3) the individuals pay continuously a contribution of
16 per cent of their contribution bases until they reach retirement age; and
(4) the highest age an individual can survive is 110. Therefore, an individual
stays in the NDC system for a maximum of 85 years.
1.4.1 No growth of the salaries and no indexation of pensions
Application 1: Constant improvement in the survival rates
Table 1.1 shows the main results under the mortality scenarios of Latvia,
Poland and Sweden. The diﬀerence between the total expenditure on pension
when the survivor dividend is not included, Endt , and the expenditure after the
inclusion of the dividend, Et, represents the amount available to ﬁnance an
unexpected increase in longevity according to Formula 1.11. By using Latvian
mortality tables, we ﬁnd that the system would accumulate a reserve of 286
million if the dividends were not distributed. This reserve could then ﬁnance
a constant increase over ages in the survival probability of 1:85 per cent or
equivalently, a decrease in mortality of 35:32 per cent. Finally, by applying
Formula 1.20 we ﬁnd that the maximal increase in life expectancy at retirement
the system can ﬁnance is e = 3:65. The discrepancies in values between the
columns of Table 1.1 are caused only by the diﬀerent mortality tables used.
Sweden has the highest life expectancy of the three NDC countries studied.
As fewer deaths occur prior to retirement, its accumulated dividend is lower.
Sweden can then cover a smaller survival improvement: if the dividends were
not distributed, the system could ﬁnance an increase in the survival probabil-
ity of only 0:59 per cent or equivalently, a decrease in mortality rates of 17.24
per cent.
1.4. Numerical illustration 51
Table 1.1: Results with no growth of the salaries and no indexation of pensions.
Latvia Poland Sweden
Endt (in mill.) 1,324 1,395 1,598
Et (in mill.) 1,610 1,642 1,710
Increase in life expectancy e 3.65 3.12 1.42
Increase in survival probability a 1.85% 1.53% 0.59%
Maximum mortality decrease 35.32% 31.86% 17.24%
Life expectancy after retirement 16.39 17.10 19.84
Negative interest rate b -1.81% -1.50% -0.58%
Application 2: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model
In order to ﬁt the Lee-Carter model to past mortality rates, data over a long
time horizon is required. Such data is obtained from the Human Mortality
Database (2014). While data for Poland and Sweden are known to be reliable
at least for the last 50 years (Fihel & Jasilionis (2011); Glei, Lundström, &
Wilmoth (2012)), some cautions are required for Latvia, Jasilionis (2013), since
their data presents some concerns during the period of Soviet rule (1940-1989).
Therefore, the Lee-Carter model is estimated on a time horizon of 20 years for
Latvia (percentage of explained variance of 64.50 per cent). With respect to
Poland and Sweden, the Lee-Carter model is estimated twice, once on a 20-
year horizon and once on a 50 year period. We chose the model with the
highest explained variance, resulting in a ﬁtting period of 20 years for Poland
(percentage of explained variance of 89.30 per cent) and 50 years for Sweden
(percentage of explained variance of 83.40 per cent). The resulting estimated
x parameters are shown in Figure 1.1.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the values of the x parameter decrease with age.18
The mortality decline has then been more important at young ages over the
18The Lee-Carter model is estimated over ages 0-100, since data for older ages ﬂuctuates
too much to provide a reliable ﬁt.
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Figure 1.1: x parameters of the Lee-Carter model in Latvia, Poland and Sweden.
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past few decades. In our analysis, we only need the values from the age of
retirement onwards.
Once the x parameters are found, the maximal general mortality decrease
that the system can cover, , is estimated, ﬁrst with Formula 1.17 and second
with Formula 1.18. Figure 1.2 shows the age-speciﬁc mortality decrease that
the system can cover by multiplying the resulting value of  with the estimated
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x parameter. The solid line represents the exact formula (Formula 1.17) and
the dashed line the approximation (Formula 1.18).
Figure 1.2: Age-speciﬁc mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model for Latvia,
Poland and Sweden.
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Three aspects should be highlighted with respect to Figure 1.2. First, instead
of a constant mortality decrease of 35.32, 31.86 and 17.24 per cent in Latvia,
Poland and Sweden respectively (Table 1.1), the decline of mortality changes
with age. The highest decline in mortality occurs for ages between 75 and
80 and takes an average value of 49.6 per cent in Latvia, 47.8 per cent in
Poland and 24.9 per cent in Sweden. The lowest decline in mortality is found
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at ages 95-100, with values of 21.5, 10.6 and 5.3 per cent in Latvia, Poland
and Sweden respectively. This structure of mortality decrease is in line with
past studies19 where the highest mortality decline from the retirement age was
also observed to be around age 70. Second, it is interesting to note that,
even if the values resulting from the approximation are lower than within the
exact calculation, the results are relatively close to each other. Indeed, the
structure of the mortality decrease over ages is similar. Third, the increase
in life expectancy e and the total expenditure on pensions with, Et, and
without, Endt , the survivor dividend remain equal to the ones calculated under
the assumption of a constant mortality decrease over ages (Table 1.1). The
mortality decrease by age is then diﬀerent between the section “Application
1: Constant improvement in the survival rates” and “Application 2: Mortality
decrease according to the Lee-Carter model”, but the general impact remains
the same.
1.4.2 With growth of salaries and indexation of pensions
Application 3: Constant improvement in survival rates
This subsection presents the results with growth of salaries (g 6= 0) and index-
ation of pensions ( 6= 0) described in the section “Case 4: Constant improve-
ment in survival rates”. Tables 1.2-1.4 introduce the results under diﬀerent
levels of salary growth and indexation of pensions for the three mortality ta-
bles analysed.20 As explained in the section “Case 4: Constant improvement
in survival rates”, salary growth has a direct impact on the survivor dividend:
19See D’Amato, Piscopo, & Russolollo (2011).
20It is assumed that the growth of salaries is at least equal to the growth of pensions, since
increases in indexation higher than increases in growth of salaries pose ﬁscal problems
to the governments. Usually, indexations of pensions are linked to price inﬂation, where
wages commonly increase faster than prices (see Whitehouse (2009b)).
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the higher the salary growth, the higher the accumulated survivor dividend at
retirement age. Therefore, we observe in Table 1.2(a) that, for a ﬁxed pension
indexation, the aﬀordable increase in survival probability is higher when the
growth of the salary increases. The same observation holds for Table 1.2(b)-
(d). The Latvian NDC scheme can aﬀord a maximal decrease inmortality of
43 per cent and an increase in life expectancy of 4.24 years when g = 3 per
cent and  = 0:5 per cent. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 present the results with Polish
and Swedish life tables. The trends are similar to the ones observed in Latvia,
even if the levels are diﬀerent. For example, Table 1.3(d) indicates that the
maximal Polish mortality decrease the system can cover is 39.1 per cent when
g = 3 per cent and  = 0:5 per cent, while the minimal decrease is of 31.9
per cent when g = . In terms of life expectancy, the increase varies from
3.12 to 3.62 (Table 1.3(c)). With Swedish life tables, the maximal aﬀordable
mortality decrease varies from 17.2 to 21.9 per cent (Table 1.4(d)), while the
corresponding increase in the life expectancy goes from 1.42 to 1.64 (Table
1.4(c)).
56 1. Longevity Risk in Notional Deﬁned Contribution Pension Schemes: A Solution
Ta
bl
e
1.
2:
Re
su
lts
un
de
rd
iﬀ
ere
nt
lev
els
of
sa
lar
yg
ro
wt
h
g
an
d
ind
ex
at
ion
of
pe
ns
ion
s
-L
at
via
.
(a
)I
nc
rea
se
in
su
rvi
va
lp
ro
ba
bil
ity
a
g
\
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
0.5
%
1.8
5%
1.0
%
1.8
9%
1.8
5%
1.5
%
1.9
4%
1.8
9%
1.8
5%
2.0
%
2.0
0%
1.9
4%
1.8
9%
1.8
5%
2.5
%
2.0
5%
2.0
0%
1.9
4%
1.8
9%
1.8
5%
3.0
%
2.1
0%
2.0
5%
1.9
9%
1.9
4%
1.8
9%
1.8
5%
(b
)M
od
iﬁe
d
ind
ex
at
ion
ra
te


0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
2.3
5%
2.4
0%
2.8
6%
2.4
5%
2.9
1%
3.3
7%
2.5
1%
2.9
6%
3.4
2%
3.8
8%
2.5
6%
3.0
2%
3.4
7%
3.9
3%
4.3
9%
2.6
1%
3.0
7%
3.5
2%
3.9
8%
4.4
4%
4.9
0%
(c
)I
nc
rea
se
in
life
ex
pe
cta
nc
y
g
\
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
0.5
%
3.6
5
1.0
%
3.7
6
3.6
5
1.5
%
3.8
7
3.7
6
3.6
5
2.0
%
3.9
9
3.8
7
3.7
6
3.6
5
2.5
%
4.1
1
3.9
9
3.8
7
3.7
6
3.6
5
3.0
%
4.2
4
4.1
1
3.9
9
3.8
7
3.7
6
3.6
5
(d
)D
ec
rea
se
in
mo
rta
lit
y
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
35
.3%
36
.7%
35
.3%
38
.2%
36
.7%
35
.3%
39
.8%
38
.2%
36
.7%
35
.3%
41
.3%
39
.7%
38
.2%
36
.7%
35
.3%
43
.0%
41
.3%
39
.7%
38
.2%
36
.7%
35
.3%
1.4. Numerical illustration 57
Ta
bl
e
1.
3:
Re
su
lts
un
de
rd
iﬀ
ere
nt
lev
els
of
sa
lar
yg
ro
wt
h
g
an
d
ind
ex
at
ion
of
pe
ns
ion
s
-P
ola
nd
.
(a
)I
nc
rea
se
in
su
rvi
va
lp
ro
ba
bil
ity
a
g
\
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
0.5
%
1.5
3%
1.0
%
1.5
7%
1.5
3%
1.5
%
1.6
1%
1.5
7%
1.5
3%
2.0
%
1.6
5%
1.6
1%
1.5
7%
1.5
3%
2.5
%
1.6
9%
1.6
5%
1.6
1%
1.5
7%
1.5
3%
3.0
%
1.7
5%
1.6
9%
1.6
5%
1.6
1%
1.5
7%
1.5
3%
(b
)M
od
iﬁe
d
ind
ex
at
ion
ra
te


0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
2.0
3%
2.0
7%
2.5
4%
2.1
2%
2.5
8%
3.0
5%
2.1
6%
2.6
2%
3.0
9%
3.5
6%
2.2
0%
2.6
7%
3.1
3%
3.6
0%
4.0
6%
2.2
5%
2.7
1%
3.1
7%
3.6
4%
4.1
1%
4.5
7%
(c
)I
nc
rea
se
in
life
ex
pe
cta
nc
y
g
\
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
0.5
%
3.1
2
1.0
%
3.2
2
3.1
2
1.5
%
3.3
1
3.2
2
3.1
2
2.0
%
3.4
1
3.3
1
3.2
1
3.1
2
2.5
%
3.5
1
3.4
1
3.3
1
3.2
1
3.1
2
3.0
%
3.6
2
3.5
1
3.4
1
3.3
1
3.2
1
3.1
2
(d
)D
ec
rea
se
in
mo
rta
lit
y
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
31
.9%
33
.2%
31
.9%
34
.6%
33
.2%
31
.9%
36
.1%
34
.6%
33
.2%
31
.9%
37
.6%
36
.1%
34
.6%
33
.2%
31
.9%
39
.1%
37
.6%
36
.0%
34
.6%
33
.2%
31
.9%
58 1. Longevity Risk in Notional Deﬁned Contribution Pension Schemes: A Solution
Ta
bl
e
1.
4:
Re
su
lts
un
de
rd
iﬀ
ere
nt
lev
els
of
sa
lar
yg
ro
wt
h
g
an
d
ind
ex
at
ion
of
pe
ns
ion
s
-S
we
de
n.
(a
)I
nc
rea
se
in
su
rvi
va
lp
ro
ba
bil
ity
a
g
\
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
0.5
%
0.5
9%
1.0
%
0.6
0%
0.5
9%
1.5
%
0.6
2%
0.6
0%
0.5
9%
2.0
%
0.6
4%
0.6
2%
0.6
0%
0.5
9%
2.5
%
0.6
5%
0.6
4%
0.6
2%
0.6
0%
0.5
9%
3.0
%
0.6
7%
0.6
5%
0.6
4%
0.6
2%
0.6
0%
0.5
9%
(b
)M
od
iﬁe
d
ind
ex
at
ion
ra
te


0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
1.0
9%
1.1
1%
1.5
9%
1.1
2%
1.6
1%
2.0
9%
1.1
4%
1.6
2%
2.1
1%
2.6
0%
1.1
6%
1.6
4%
2.1
3%
2.6
1%
3.1
0%
1.1
7%
1.6
6%
2.1
4%
2.6
3%
3.1
2%
3.6
0%
(c
)I
nc
rea
se
in
life
ex
pe
cta
nc
y
g
\
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
0.5
%
1.4
2
1.0
%
1.4
6
1.4
2
1.5
%
1.5
0
1.4
6
1.4
2
2.0
%
1.5
5
1.5
0
1.4
6
1.4
2
2.5
%
1.5
9
1.5
5
1.5
0
1.4
6
1.4
2
3.0
%
1.6
4
1.5
9
1.5
4
1.5
0
1.4
6
1.4
2
(d
)D
ec
rea
se
in
mo
rta
lit
y
0.
5%
1.
0%
1.
5%
2.
0%
2.
5%
3.
0%
17
.2%
18
.1%
17
.2%
19
.0%
18
.1%
17
.2%
19
.9%
19
.0%
18
.1%
17
.2%
20
.9%
19
.9%
19
.0%
18
.1%
17
.2%
21
.9%
20
.9%
19
.9%
19
.0%
18
.1%
17
.2%
1.4. Numerical illustration 59
Application 4: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model
Formulas 1.27-1.28 developed in the section “Case 5: Mortality decrease ac-
cording to the Lee-Carter model” are applied with the three analysed life
tables. We choose to analyse four diﬀerent scenarios with respect to salary
growth (g) and indexation of pensions : (i) g = 2 per cent and  = 1 per cent
(solid line);(ii) g = 3 per cent and  = 1 per cent (dashed line); (iii) g = 3 per
cent and  = 0 per cent (pointed line); and (iv) g = 2 per cent and  = 2 per
cent (dashed and points line).
Figure 1.3 shows the maximal mortality decrease according to Formula 1.27
(section “Case 5: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model”), that
is, the exact mortality decrease. The values presented in Figure 1.3 result from
the multiplication of the general mortality decrease  by the x parameters
found in the section “Application 2: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-
Carter model”. Naturally, the patterns are similar to the ones described in
the section “Application 2: Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter
model”, while the levels change due to the diﬀerent values of pension and salary
growth. A higher salary growth g, and a lower pension indexation, , allow the
system to cover a more important mortality decrease. Finally, the same remark
holds as with no pension and salary growth (section “Application 2: Mortality
decrease according to the Lee-Carter model”): the increase in life expectancy,
e, the total expenditure on pensions with, Et, and without the survivor
dividend, Endt ,remain equal to the ones calculated under the assumption of a
constant mortality decrease over ages (Tables 1.2-1.4).
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Figure 1.3: Age-speciﬁc mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model for Latvia,
Poland and Sweden, with growth of salaries and pension indexation.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
M
o
r
t
a
li
ty
 d
ec
re
as
e
g=2% and lambda=2% g=3% and lambda=0%
g=2% and lambda=1% g=3% and lambda=1%
(a) Latvia
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
M
o
r
t
a
li
ty
 d
ec
re
as
e
g=2% and lambda=2% g=3% and lambda=0%
g=2% and lambda=1% g=3% and lambda=1%
(b) Poland
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
M
o
r
t
a
li
ty
 d
ec
re
as
e
g=2% and lambda=2% g=3% and lambda=0%
g=2% and lambda=1% g=3% and lambda=1%
(c) Sweden
Retrospective analysis
In the preceding sections, we were interested in ﬁnding the maximal mortality
decrease (or survival increase) the system could theoretically face, under dif-
ferent assumptions. In this last part of our analysis, we consider whether the
accumulated survivor dividend of the generic NDC scheme we modelled could
have covered the eﬀective mortality decline observed from 1980 to the year of
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the most recent available life tables, that is, 2009 in Poland and 2011 in Latvia
and Sweden. The salary structure is kept constant over time for comparability
reasons. The total expenditure on pensions, when the survivor dividend is
not included, is computed using two diﬀerent mortality tables in each coun-
try. The ﬁrst one refers to the total expenditure on pensions when the latest
available mortality table is used, denoted End(2011)2011 in Latvia and Sweden and
E
nd(2009)
2009 in Poland. The second one refers to the total expenditure on pen-
sions when the 1980 mortality table is used, denoted End(1980)2011 in Latvia and
Sweden and End(1980)2009 in Poland. The diﬀerence between the two provides the
additional cost that the system will need to cover as a result of past mortality
improvements if the NDC scheme uses the 1980 period life tables to determine
the pension beneﬁts instead of using the most recently available life tables. If
this additional cost is smaller than the amount corresponding to the survivor
dividend accumulated in 2011 (2009 for Poland), then the scheme is able to
cover the increase in longevity. Table 1.5 presents the results for the three
analysed life tables. In the three cases, we conclude that the survivor dividend
could have covered past increases in life expectancy, since the increase in costs
is smaller than the accumulated reserves, that is, End(t)t  End(1980)t < Dac(1980)(65;t) ,
with t = 2009; 2011.
Table 1.5: Retrospective analysis.
Latvia21 Poland Sweden
Endt (in mill.) 1,324 1,395 1,598
E
nd(1980)
t (in mill.) 1,217 1,279 1,453
Endt   End(1980)t (in mill.) 107 116 145
Survivor dividend (in mill.),
using 1980 tables: Dac(1980)(65;t) 310 290 203
Is Endt   End(1980)t < Dac(1980)(65;t) ? Yes Yes Yes
21t=2009 for Poland and t=2011 for Latvia and Sweden.
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1.5 Conclusions
In the present chapter we show that the survivor dividend can cover an unex-
pected increase in longevity, reﬂected either by a decrease in mortality rates,
an increase in survival probabilities or an increase in life expectancy at the re-
tirement age. We found the mathematical formulas for the maximal mortality
improvement an NDC scheme can cover under diﬀerent scenarios, and applied
them to three diﬀerent case studies.
We ﬁrst assume a constant mortality decrease over ages and we ﬁnd that the
maximum decrease that can be ﬁnanced is 35.3 per cent with Latvian, 31.9 per
cent with Polish and 17.2 per cent with Swedish mortality tables. Second, we
derive age-speciﬁc mortality decreases the system can ﬁnance under the Lee-
Carter model, resulting in a mortality decline as small as 2.3 per cent for ages
around 100 in Sweden and as large as 60 per cent for ages around 80 in Latvia.
Third, the impacts of diﬀerent salary and pension growths are analysed. As
expected, an increased salary growth and a reduced pension indexation result
in more important mortality improvements that an NDC scheme can cover.
Finally, the retrospective analysis demonstrates that mortality improvements
over the last 30 years could have been ﬁnanced through the survivor dividend.
Indeed, in the three mortality scenarios presented, the amount of the accumu-
lated survivor dividend exceeds by far the amount required to ﬁnance mortality
improvements observed from 1980 to 2011 (Latvia, Sweden) or 1980 to 2009
(Poland). The survivor dividend proves then to be an interesting solution for
NDC schemes to ﬁnance future longevity improvements, provided that this
dividend is not distributed as in Sweden.
This chapter shows that the reserves that an NDC scheme accumulates when
it does not distribute the survivor dividend are much larger than the required
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amount to ﬁnance the longevity risk. Therefore, part of the accumulated re-
serve could be used to ﬁnance some other beneﬁts or unexpected risks. For
instance, the survivor dividend could cover the introduction of a minimum
pension providing a minimum standard of living for the pensioners, in addi-
tion to covering future longevity improvements. It would be also of interest
to determine if the dividend could act as an automatic balancing mechanism22
to reestablish the liquidity and/or the sustainability in pay-as-you-go pension
systems. Distributing or not the survivor dividend becomes a very important
decision that any NDC countries should seriously consider, especially the coun-
tries currently considering the introduction of NDC pension schemes such as
Egypt, China and Greece.
To conclude, this chapter highlights reserves that several NDC schemes are
currently accumulating and not using. These reserves can be used in diﬀerent
ways, one of them discussed here being the ﬁnancing of future mortality im-
provements. It is important that governments of countries using NDC schemes
discuss, decide and reveal for which purpose these accumulates reserves are
meant to be used.
22According to Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009), an automatic balancing mechanism is a set of
predetermined measures established by law to be applied immediately according to a
solvency or sustainability indicator.
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How to ﬁnance pensions: Optimal
strategies for pay-as-you-go pension
systems
Godínez Olivares, H., Boado-Penas, M.C., and Pantelous, A.A. 1
The aim of this chapter is to design optimal strategies using non-linear dynamic
programming to guarantee the required level of liquidity in pay-as-you-go pension
systems through changes in the key variables of the system, such as, the contribution
rate, retirement age and/or indexation of pensions. These strategies, also known
as Automatic Balancing Mechanisms (ABMs), calculate the optimal path of these
variables over time, managing ﬂuctuations in longevity, fertility rates, salary growth
or any other kind of uncertainty faced by the pension scheme without repeated
legislative intervention. A numerical application of our model, that uses the
projection of the population structure of two representative countries, illustrates
the main ﬁndings of the chapter.
Keywords: ﬁnancial equilibrium, optimisation, pay-as-you-go, public pensions,
risk.
2.1 Introduction
The evolution and forecast of the relevant parameters involved in the provision
of pension schemes are major topics of on-going discussion for the policy and
decision-making committees in many EU countries. Their public pension sys-
tems are usually ﬁnanced on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) basis where pensions
1This chapter is based on the paper ‘How to ﬁnance pensions: Optimal strategies for pay-as-
you-go pension systems’ by Godínez-Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016). Journal
of Forecasting. 35(1), 13-33.
65
66 2. How to ﬁnance pensions: Optimal strategies for pay-as-you-go pension systems
for retirees are paid by the contributions of the working-age population. It is
well understood that PAYGO systems require a balance between the beneﬁts
paid to the pensioners and the contributions made by the active workers, what
is also referred as intergenerational solidarity2. A successfully PAYGO system
needs to reﬂect intergenerational solidarity and long-term sustainability.
The decline in fertility rates, the increase in longevity and the current forecasts
for the ageing of the baby-boom generation will contribute to a substantial in-
crease in the old-age dependency ratio, and this will raise serious concerns for
the sustainability of the PAYGO pension systems. With continuous improve-
ments in life expectancy, pensions are paid over a longer time horizon, which
causes great diﬃculties when the system does not expect such improvements.
The European Commission (2012b), shows a clear increase in life expectancy
at birth for males and females of 7.9 and 6.5 years respectively from 2010 to
2060. Furthermore, the European population aged 60+ is increasing annually
by two million and is estimated to become almost twice as high in 2060 as it
was in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, in 2012, pension expenditure
represented a very large and rising share of public expenditure: more than 10
per cent of GDP and this is forecast to rise to 12.5 per cent in 2060 in the EU
as a whole. Thus Milevsky (2010) considers a PAYGO system as a high-risk
funding method where the sponsors provide beneﬁts to retirees when they are
due and payable, and a real fund is never accumulated. Brown (1992) states
that countries should develop an acceptable wealth transfer equilibrium given
their ageing population and increase the contributions to maintain balance.
According to Valdés-Prieto (2006) many European PAYGO pension systems
2Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b), deﬁne intergenerational solidarity as the willingness of
diﬀerent groups of people to participate in a common pool, sharing actual experience,
including any losses emerging. In the context of public pension systems, the concept refers
to both young and old generations.
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tend to require periodic adjustments to maintain the long-term sustainabil-
ity, mainly because of demographic and economic uncertainty. Furthermore,
García-Ferrer & Del Hoyo (1991) states that population predictions have fre-
quently failed to give proper guidance on the inherent degree of uncertainty
and consequently demographic forecasts have quickly become obsolete (see
also Lee & Shripad (1998a) and Lee & Shripad (1998b)). In fact, the common
trend in responses to what is a pensions crisis is a wave of parametric pension
adjustments in Europe, for example in France, Greece, Hungary, Romania
and Spain3. These parametric reforms usually include, among others, changes
in the contribution ceilings, increases in the retirement age or changes in the
indexation of pensions.
Following this process of reforms, Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009) and Vidal-Meliá et
al. (2010) propose an Automatic Balance Mechanism4 (ABM) deﬁned as a set
of predetermined measures established by law to be applied immediately as
required according to an indicator that reﬂects the ﬁnancial health of the sys-
tem. Its purpose, through successive application, is to re-establish the ﬁnancial
equilibrium of PAYGO pension systems with the aim of making those systems
viable without the repeated intervention of the legislators. They argue that
there are three reasons for introducing an ABM method, ﬁrst, to adapt the
system to changes in socio-economic and demographic conditions; secondly, to
create a credible institutional framework in the sense that promises of pension
payments are kept; and ﬁnally, to minimise the use of the pension system as
an electoral weapon. As examined by Turner (2009) at least 12 countries have
3See Whitehouse (2009a,b) and OECD (2012).
4See Appendix D.
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indexation of beneﬁts linked to life expectancy or any other kind of automatic
adjustment5.
It is important to highlight that three papers, Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b),
Pantelous & Zimbidis (2008) and Gannon, Legros, & Touzé (2013), propose
parametric reforms in the PAYGO pension systems introducing the concept of
a liquidity or contingency fund in order to absorb unexpected events that might
aﬀect their liquidity. As emphasized by Pantelous & Zimbidis (2008), this non-
zero contingency fund is acting as a buﬀer, ﬂuctuating deliberately in the short
run and absorbing partially or completely the uncertainty in mortality, fertility
rates or other events. Similarly, Gannon et al. (2013) deﬁne this buﬀer fund as
the inter-temporal budget balance of the pension system that brings promised
future expenditures in line with expected future revenues. Siebert (2005) states
that at any given moment the system adjusts its beneﬁts in accordance with
the inter-temporal budget constraint.
The aim of this chapter is to design a new automatic balancing mechanism
(for the very ﬁrst time, according to the authors’ knowledge) to restore liquid-
ity into the system under a non-linear framework using diﬀerent population
projections (Spain and Japan). This ABM is the result of minimising a chosen
logarithmic function and simultaneously calculating the optimal path for the
contribution rate, the retirement age and the indexation of pensions for the
PAYGO system. As a result, the derived contingency fund is able to absorb
ﬂuctuations in longevity, fertility rates, salary growth or any other events.
Our method aims to keep the future growth rates of the projections for the
contribution rate, the normal retirement age and the indexation of pensions at
a minimum level and provide the system with a long-term sustainability. Fur-
5For more information on ABM’s see, for instance, Turner (2009), Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009),
OECD (2012) and Appendix D.
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thermore, our ABM model can be easily generalised including more parameters
and is applicable to any PAYGO pension system.
Following this introduction, the chapter is organised as follows. The next sec-
tion describes the mathematical preliminaries together with the numerical op-
timisation and brieﬂy discusses the main notation and deﬁnitions. Moreover, it
gives details about our model and the projections of the parameters involved.
Section 3 shows a representative and practical application for two diﬀerent
structures of population and suggests how an ABM model should be designed
for both symmetric and asymmetric cases. Section 4 provides concluding com-
ments of the chapter. The present chapter has two appendices, ﬁrst the main
automatic balancing mechanisms of some countries are described (Appendix
D); second the gradient method is explained in more detail (Appendix E).
2.2 Model formulation for a PAYGO pension system
This section presents the optimisation model together with the optimal paths
of the parameters involved in the PAYGO system such as the contribution
rate, the age of normal retirement and the indexation of pensions. The pa-
rameters of the dynamic model are the buﬀer fund, also called the contingency
fund,fFgn2N, that represents the state equation or state trajectory and the de-
cision variables: contribution ratefcgn2N, age of retirement fx(r)gn2N and the
indexation of pensions fgn2N. The model uses an objective function and
minimises the growth rates of the decision variables, as described in eq.2.1.
In general the decision variables are represented by fdgn = fd0n; d1n; :::; dkng while
speciﬁcally in our model djn = (cjn; x(r)jn ; jn) minimises fn(djn; n) in eq. 2.1.
The variable Fn ﬂuctuates deliberately to absorb changes in fertility, mortality
projections and any other events that might aﬀect the liquidity indicator in
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the pension system. Consequently, the aim of the forecast variables is to act
as an ABM, re-establishing the liquidity of the PAYGO pension system over
time according to pre-established rules without the intervention of the state.
2.2.1 Mathematical preliminaries
This subsection presents the mathematical notation and terminology for a
better understanding of the optimal path of the decision variables for our
PAYGO model. Following Bertsekas (1999), our mathematical optimisation
model is represented by a decisions set fdgn and a cost function f that maps
elements D into real numbers. The set D consists of the available decisions
d and the cost f(d) is a scalar measure of undesirability of choosing decisions
d. In general, the aim is to ﬁnd an optimal d 2 D such that f(d)  f(d);
8d 2 D. In our problem, fn(djn; n) is deﬁned by eq.(2.1) and D is the set
of all the real values that the projected variables could take. Some basic
deﬁnitions associated with an optimisation non-linear problem in discrete time
are introduced below.6
Deﬁnition 2.1. A time set N is a subgroup of (<;+). For each set Q and
interval I, the set of all maps from I into Q is denoted by QI = fqjq : I ! Qg.
In our case, N+ is the set of non-negative elements.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A systemP = (N;D;U; f; F ) consists of a: i) A time set N ;
ii) A non-empty set D called the decision space of P; iii) A non-empty set
U called the constraints of P; iv) A map f : Dn ! D called the transition
map ofP, which is deﬁned on a subset Dn of f(n; ; x; u)j; n 2 N;   n; x 2
X; u 2 U [;n)g such that the non-triviality, restriction, semi-group and identity
holds; and v) A state trajectory fFgn2N.
6See Sontag (1998), Bertsekas (1999), Bertsekas (2005) and Bradley (1997).
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The cost or objective function f is deﬁned as fn(djn; n) where djn is the permis-
sible decisions that is chosen from the set D and n is the step of the process
with n 2 N . In our model, D consists of the values that the projected de-
cision variables can take every year n. Bradley (1997) states that the next
state depends entirely on the current state of the process and the current de-
cision made. As noted by Bertsekas (1999), djn = (d0n; d1n; :::; dkn) is the decision
trajectory and the equation dn+1 = Fn(dn; n) is called the state equation or
state trajectory. The set Un specify constraints on the decision vectors. The
system constraints U could be, gj(D)  0; j = 1; 2; :::m; non-linear constraint
and hk(D) = 0; k = 1; 2; :::; l; linear constraint equations. In our model, the
constraints are deﬁned by the minimum and maximum values of the projected
decision variables and rates of change in each step/year. In other words, we
need to ﬁnd a sequence djn = (d0n; d1n; :::; dkn) which
minfn(d
j
n; n)
s:t: :
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
dn+1 = Fn(d
j
n; n); n = 1; 2; :::; !;
d0 : given;
djn = (c
j
n; x
(r)j
n ; jn) 2 <n; j = 1; 2; :::; !;
hk(U) = 0; k = 1; 2; :::; l;
gj(U)  0; j = 1; 2; :::m;
Following general ideas about optimal non-linear optimisation in discrete time,
the Gradient method is used in the chapter. The gradient method is a well-
developed method that works with inequality constraints. These inequalities
are modiﬁed to be equalities using a linear slack variable (see Venkataraman
(2009)). The new equality constraints are expanded into Taylor series. Then
with these linear equations, the constraint equations are used to reduce the
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number of independent variables. The modiﬁed problem minimises f(D) sub-
ject to hk(D) = 0; k = 1; 2; :::; l and gj(D) + qn+j = 0; j = 1; 2; :::m, dminn 
qi  dmaxn ; i = 1; 2; :::; v and dp+j  0; j = 1; 2; :::m with D = [d1; d2; :::; dN ].
See Appendix E for more details about the gradient method.
2.2.2 PAYGO Model
Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b) propose two diﬀerent models7 to identify the
optimal path for the contribution rate and retirement age only. The functional
objective that determines the smoothness of the path includes weight changes
for the two variables. These weights reﬂect the expectations of the participants
in the pension system as well as the underlying demographic trends. The func-
tional objective has a quadratic form that minimises the distance between the
projected variables and their pre-deﬁned values. Using standard linearisation
procedures the authors obtained a closed solution for the optimal path of the
projections. Both models try to keep the variables at the same level over time.
Similarly, Gannon et al. (2013) propose a model where the objective function is
quadratic and the system is adjusted with the introduction of two coeﬃcients
which modify the present and future payroll taxes and pension expenditure.
However, they do not specify the values of the key variables that are involved
in a pension system (contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of
pensions).
Following Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b), Pantelous & Zimbidis (2008) con-
struct a discrete time stochastic model including several variables such as dif-
ferent investment strategies, contribution rates, retirement ages and levels of
7The ﬁrst deterministic model is based on a continuous framework while the second one is
a stochastic model in discrete time as, in practice, it is impermissible to make changes to
the variables in continuous time.
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pension beneﬁts. Finally, the authors allow the fund to take positive or neg-
ative values. Again, the functional objective has a quadratic form and the
optimal path of the control variables is assumed to be stabilised around the
initial pre-established value. Both Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b) and Pan-
telous & Zimbidis (2008) did not try to solve the non-linear problem directly,
but a linearisation method has been suggested instead.
In our approach, we suggest a diﬀerent way to forecast the contribution rate
and the age of normal retirement. In particular, the problem is settled in
a non-linear framework and the optimal path for the decision variables are
developed. Additionally, the indexation of pensions is introduced as a third
decision variable. Another advantage comparing with previous papers is that
the functional objective that is used for the determination of the optimal,
smooth path for the projected variables is deﬁned to minimise the percentage
of the changes over time using a logarithm function.8 The logarithmic function
is widely used in economics because its elasticity can easily be found. In
our case, the logarithmic cost criterion measures the percentage of changes in
particular variables over time. So we are introducing the idea of minimising the
change rate of the decision variables involved in the projections (contribution
rate, normal retirement age and indexation of pensions) instead of trying to
stabilise them around an initial set value, as in the case of previous models
using a quadratic function.
8We use the logarithmic function due to its nature of being strictly monotonic increasing and
concave in the entire domain. More details about interesting properties and comments for
this type of function in economics can be found in Luenberger (1992) and Kübler (2010).
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Analytically, the non-linear function to minimise is given by:
f(dn; n) = mincn;x(r)n ;n
h NX
n=1
h
1log
cn+1
cn

+
12log
x(r)n+1
x
(r)
n

+ 23log
n+1
n
ii
(2.1)
where
cn; x
(r)
n ; n are the projected variables during year n.
1, 2, and 3 are the weights that measure the impact that occurs when the
projected variables cn, x(r)n and n change over time, where 1 + 2 + 3 = 19.
1 and 2 are coeﬃcients that have been introduced in the growth rates of the
age of normal retirement and in the indexation of pensions to deal with the
metric problems that are present due to the nature of the logarithmic function,
as cn, x(r)n and n have diﬀerent units and constraints10, i.e.
1 =
log(c)
log(x
(r)
 )
;
2 =
log(c)
log(1)
1
f
n+1
n
0g
+
log(c)
log(2)
1
f
n+1
n
0g
;
where, 1fj2!g is the characteristic or indicator function. It takes the value of
1 for all values that satisﬁed the condition j 2 ! and 0 in other case.
The non-linear model is derived from the basic equation in a deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) PAYGO system and, similarly to Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b), we
9As noted by Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b) the weights  are key parameters which reﬂect
the expectations of all participants in the pension system as well as the underlying demo-
graphic trends. The parameters would be obtained after research and negotiations with all
the parties involved in the public pension system.
10c, x(r) and 1 are the maximum increase that are allowed (and 2 decrease for n)
per year in the contribution rate cn, the age of normal retirement x(r)n and the indexation
of pensions n.
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introduce a contingency fund into the basic equation. The dynamics of the
fund (state equation Fn(dn; n)) can be expressed as:
Fn = (1 + Jn)Fn 1 + cnWn(n; g; x(r)n ) Bn(n; g; x(r)n ; n); (2.2)
where Jn is the growth risk-free rate (investments in T-bills) of the fund during
year n; cn; x(r)n ; n are the projected variables during year n; Wn is the total
contribution base paid at n; Bn is the total expenditure on pensions at n that
depends on the growth of salaries, g, the retirement age x(r)n and the indexation
of pensions n.11
Remark 2.1. Extensive discussion about and properties of the contingency
fund can be found in Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b). In theory, upper and
lower bounds can be imposed in the contingency fund. Setting upper bound
could make sense due to the restriction of risk-free investments of the fund
whereas lower bound might be set to prevent high levels of deﬁcit. In this
chapter, negative values of the fund are acceptable since our aim is to get a
smooth transition of the contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of
pensions to make the model applicable.12 Negative values of the fund could be
covered by government debt, however, non-smooth jumps in the key parameters
are not easy to justify in any pension parametric reform.
The model is studied for two interesting cases, the symmetric and the asym-
metric. Palmer (2013) states that under a symmetric ABM, any surplus that
might arise would be automatically distributed. In the absence of a symmetric
11The indexation is a key parameter in a pension system and it refers to the revalorisation
of the pensions in payment; according to Whitehouse, D’Addio, Chomik, & Reilly (2009)
most OECD countries adjust pensions in payment to reﬂect changes in costs and standards
of living. The procedures for such adjustment play an essential role in providing income
security in retirement.
12Upper and lower bounds were imposed as the 10 per cent of the GDP for each country.
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ABM an undistributed surplus is maintained. Furthermore, Alho et al. (2013)
state that the balancing mechanism can be symmetric, adjusting for both posi-
tive and negative deviations from the ﬁnancial health indicator, or asymmetric,
as in the Swedish system, which balances only if the solvency ratio is less than
1, i.e. the amount of assets is less than the amount of liabilities.13 Under the
symmetric design, our model determines whether the contribution rate and
the age of normal retirement (and indexation of pensions) are reduced when
the buﬀer fund has a surplus (deﬁcit) or increased (decreased) in periods of
deﬁcit (surplus).
At the end of the period of study, the value of the fund is enforced to be equal
to zero, i.e. Fn = 0, if n = N , as a constraint in the optimisation under
the symmetric case to avoid that the system accumulates reserves at all times.
Under the asymmetric case, changes in the projected variables only occur when
a deﬁcit in the fund arises, thus the terminal condition is Fn  0, if n = N .
The constraints, hk(D); gj(D) for the values of the forecast variables are as
follows: for the contribution rate, cn, the age of normal retirement, x(r)n ,
and the indexation of pensions, n, we impose upper and lower bounds,
cmax; x
(r)
max; max 2 R0 and cmin; x(r)min 2 R0, min 2 R respectively. Fi-
nally, a smooth path for the projected variables is obtained when the fol-
lowing constraints are imposed: c1  cn+1
cn
 c2; x(r)1 
x
(r)
n+1
x
(r)
n
 x(r)2;
1  n+1
n
 2; where c1; c2; x(r)1; x(r)2; 1; 2 2 <.
13Under the particular case of the Swedish pensions system Alho et al. (2013) argue that
with symmetric balancing, systematic overestimation of life expectancy transfers money
from the accounts of the cohorts, whose pensions were underestimated, to other cohorts.
In contrast, in the asymmetric scenario, if the system were otherwise in exact equilibrium,
systematic underestimation of life expectancy for pensioner cohorts causes the ratio of
assets to liabilities to fall below unity, causing a downward adjustment of the accounts
of all workers and pensioners, thereby spreading out the consequence to all workers and
pensioners in the insurance pool.
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The solution of the optimisation problem is studied in a deterministic, discrete
time framework and derived numerically.14
Thus, eventually, we need to numerically solve the problem (2.1):
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2.3 Numerical application
This section presents the forecasts for the contribution rate, the normal re-
tirement age and the indexation of pensions for a generic PAYGO pension
system in a dynamic non-linear framework. Our goal is to show the numerical
14Due to the nature of the non-linear dynamical system and the forecasts of the three main
variables we have 3(N   1) parameters for the optimisation problem. To enable numerical
computation methods (LaValle (2006)), a family of trajectories need to be speciﬁed in
terms of a parameter space and the optimisation can be viewed as an incremental search
in the parameter space while all constraints are being satisﬁed.
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application of our model using the population structure of two representative
countries: Spain and Japan. The projected data from Spain is obtained from
the National Statistics Institute of Spain. Japan’s data is provided by the
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
These countries present a very diﬀerent age structure. Japan represents a
mature-aged population and Spain an ageing one. For comparison purposes the
two populations have been normalised. Moreover, the normalised structures of
these populations are very helpful in investigating diﬀerent scenarios and easily
extrapolating useful conclusions for other countries with similar population
characteristics.
The dynamics behind the total contribution base, Wn, and the total expen-
diture on pensions, Bn, are complex as they depend on variables such as the
growth of salaries, g, the normal retirement age, x(r)n , and the indexation of
pensions, n.
The total contribution base, Wn, is modelled at time n = 1 as:
W1 =
0@x(r)1  1X
x=xe
lx;1  wage(x)
1A ;
where, xe is the entry age into the labour market.
lx;1 is the number of people alive at age x at time 1. We assume that lx;n is
distributed uniformly over the year.
wage(x) is the average wage15 for individuals who are x years old.
For n > 1, we have:
15For simplicity, the terms wage, salary and contribution base are considered to be synonyms.
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Wn =
0B@

x
(r)
n

 1X
x=xe
(lx;n)  wage(x)  (1 + g)n
1CA
+ (x(r)n mod

x(r)n

)l
x
(r)
n

;n
 wage(x(r)n )(1 + g)n (2.4)
Where,

x
(r)
n

is the ﬂoor function, i.e.,

x
(r)
n

maps a real number to the largest
previous integer number and x(r)n mod

x
(r)
n

is the modulus operation that ﬁnds
the remainder of the division x(r)n =

x
(r)
n

.
Modelling B(n) is a more complicated task as indexation of pensions, n is
dynamic over time. The expenditure on pensions at year n=1 can be expressed
as:
B1 = Px(r)1 ;1
l
x
(r)
1 ;1
+ P
x
(r)
1 +1;1
l
x
(r)
1 +1;1
+ P
x
(r)
1 +2;1
l
x
(r)
1 +2;1
+ ::: =
!X
x=x
(r)
1
Px;1lx;1;
where, P
x
(r)
1 ;1
is the average pension at time 1 for pensioners aged x(r)1 and !
is the last age to which a person can survive.
For n > 1, the total expenditure on pensions is forecast as follows:
Bn =

1  (x(r)n mod

x(r)n

)l
x
(r)
n

;n

 P
x
(r)
n

;n
+
!X
x=

x
(r)
n
Px;nlx;n (2.5)
Where,

x
(r)
n

is the ceiling function, i.e.,

x
(r)
n

maps a real number to the
smallest next integer number, and Px;n can be written as:
Px;n = Px 1;n 1  (1 + n 1);
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with P
x
(r)
n ;n
= P
x
(r)
n ;n
1fx(r)n ;n=1g + Px(r)n ;n  (1 + g)t1fx(r)n ;n>1g:
2.3.1 Data
The entry age into the labour market is assumed to be 20, i.e, xe = 20. Under
the projection of the Spanish population structure the average age in year 0 is
48.9 and for Japanese structure is 52.7 and the median 52. In the last year of
study16 (n=20) the average age increases by 6.2 years for Spain and 4.8 years
for Japan. Optimal non-linear optimisation has been applied using the same
level of projective salaries and pensions over time in order to make the results
comparable.
Since the forecasts are realised for the three decision variables, the minimum
value for the contribution rate, age of normal retirement and indexation of
pensions are given respectively by 15 per cent, 65 and -2 per cent and the upper
values are 20 per cent, 68 and 2 per cent respectively. It is also assumed that
the change in the contribution rate varies between 0.3 per cent and 0.5 per cent,
the age of normal retirement between 1.5 and 3 months and the indexation
of pensions between -2 per cent and 2 per cent. These values are in line
with the most important reforms in the 34 OECD member countries between
January 2009 and September 2013 (see OECD (2014)).17 The accumulated
16When we apply the model in a longer horizon, 40 years, we have a similar convergence
in the values of the projected variables with a diﬀerence in how the fund accumulate the
surpluses.
17Some indexation rules move towards less generous beneﬁts, for example, the indexation
of pensions in Austria, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia have frozen automatic adjustments
for all but the lowest earners. In Spain, the retirement age is being raised gradually from
65 to 67 years in 2027. In France the contribution rate for the civil servants will increase
0.27 per cent per year during the next years.
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fund increases at an annual rate of 3 per cent18 while the annual salary growth
is equal to 2.5 per cent.
Figure 2.1 shows the two diﬀerent structures of population that we are using
in this numerical example. The pyramid represents the normalised mature
population of Japan (grey colour) versus the ageing population of Spain (light
colour) to highlight the diﬀerences.
Figure 2.1: Projection of the Spanish population versus Japanese population structure.
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18An average value for the past 20 years of 1 year T-bills according to the Federal Reserve
of the United States of America. A sensitivity analysis of this value is provided in section
3.3.
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Japan’s population has two peaks in 2012 at ages 64-66 and 38-41 correspond-
ing to the ﬁrst baby boom of 1947-1949 and second baby boom 1971-1974
respectively. By 2032 population forecasts are worse showing two peaks at
ages 83-85 and 59-61.
For Spain’s population the peak is at ages 34-36 in 2012 corresponding to the
creation of the Social Security and the demographic boom in the 1960s and
early 1970s. By 2032 the population trend continues and the peak is at age
53-55, corresponding to the same population that in 2012.
Under the Spanish population structure, Figure 2.1c, there are 2.96 contribu-
tors who ﬁnance each pensioner, compared with 2.29 under Japan population,
Figure 2.1a. This ratio is known as the age-dependency19 ratio and it worsens
over time, reaching values of 1.97 and 1.56, Figure 2.1d and 2.1b respectively,
in 20 years. No unemployment is considered in our analysis.
Figure 2.2: Salary and pension structure.
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Figure 2.2 shows the salary and pension structure at the beginning of our
study. The wage structure shows a concave function, Katz & Autor (1999),
Becker (1962), Becker (1993), Ben-Porath (1967), Mincer (1974), provide a
coherent explanation of relatively timeless qualitative features of the wage
structure that have been found in almost every country: higher earnings for
19This ratio measures the number of elderly people relative to those of working age.
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more-educated workers and upward sloping and concave age earnings proﬁles.
This concave function in Figure 2.2 shows the peak of earnings at age 52
after that the salary function starts to decrease with age. We use the same
salary and pension structure for both population structures which allows us to
compare the results. The initial pension is assumed to be 60 per cent20 of the
contribution base in a particular year.
2.3.2 Results
One of the main characteristics of this model is that it allows the system to
accumulate surpluses. In this sense, we could design both an asymmetric and
a symmetric design of the pension system.21
Figure 2.3 shows the optimal forecasting strategy when only one decision vari-
able is involved.22 For the ageing structure, we can see that if we designed an
ABM to restore the liquidity into the system with only one decision variable,
the age of normal retirement, Figure 2.3c (black line), would need to increase
to 71 years whereas the contribution rate, Figure 2.3a, would increase to 22.5
per cent. For the mature aged population (grey line), the results are even
worse. The age of normal retirement (Figure 2.3c) and contribution rate (Fig-
ure 2.3a) needs to increase to 78 years and 32 per cent respectively. At the
same time the fund remains negative for the ﬁrst 9 years but the system keeps
balanced afterwards.
20This is the average initial pension for a median earner in the EU and very similar to the
median earner of the OECD countries that is 57.9 per cent according with the OECD (see
OECD (2014)).
21In some cases both the asymmetric and symmetric designs provide the same results, see
for example ﬁgure 2.4a and 2.4b.
22We set one of the parameters  = 1 and the other two equal to zero depending on which
variable we projected.
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Figure 2.3: Results when only one decision variable is forecasted under the Spanish (black
line) and Japanese (grey line) structures.
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If the indexation of pensions is forecast as the only decision variable no so-
lutions are found for FN  0. However, if we decrease the limit of the lower
bound, we ﬁnd that the indexation would need to decrease for the mature pop-
ulation until  14:6 per cent and for the ageing population to  5:0 per cent to
set FN  0, which makes it very inapplicable in practice.
Figure 2.4 shows the results when we project the three variables simultane-
ously with the same weight in the parameters.23 Figure 2.4a shows that the
adjustment in the contribution rate for the ageing population structure in-
creases from 15.0 per cent to 17.5 per cent after 9 years, remaining unchanged
after that under both the symmetric and asymmetric designs. At the same
23We set j = 1=3 for j = 1; 2; 3.
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time, Figure 2.4b, the age of normal retirement increases from 65 to 67 over a
period of 17 years.
The indexation of pensions under the symmetric scenario, Figure 2.4c, de-
creases at the beginning of the period and then increases after ten years in
order to redistribute the surpluses that have been accumulated during the
period. It can be shown that the optimal path of the indexation of pensions
stabilises around the value of 0.77 per cent after ten years. However, under the
asymmetric design, the indexation decreases and stabilizes around the value
of 0.72 per cent.
Figure 2.4: Results when the three decision variables are forecasted simultaneously for the
symmetric (solid line) and asymmetric (dashed line) with Spanish (black line) and Japanese
(grey line) population structure.
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(d) Accumulated fund
As can be shown in Figure 2.4d, unsurprisingly, the fund presents an accumu-
lation period during the ﬁrst 15 years and a de-accumulation period over the
latter years. The main reason for this is to absorb ﬂuctuations in the popu-
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lation structure owing mainly to changes in longevity and fertility rates. As
expected, under the asymmetric design, the amount of the accumulated fund
is higher.
Since the Japanese population structure is “older”, projections of the decision
variables take higher values. For example, under the symmetric design (grey
solid line) the contribution rate needs to increase from 15 to 20 per cent,
Figure 2.4a, the age of normal retirement from 65 to 68, Figure 2.4b, and the
growth of pensions, Figure 2.4c, needs to decrease by an annual 2 per cent
over almost a 15 year period in order to restore the liquidity into the system.
The accumulated fund, Figure 2.4d, is in deﬁcit for the ﬁrst 17 years. The
diﬀerence with the asymmetric design (grey dashed line) is that the amount of
the pension decreases by 2 per cent over all the period and consequently the
fund accumulates a higher amount in the last years of the study.
The results indicate that the projected decision variables take higher values (or
lower values for the indexation of pensions) under the mature aged population
to make the system balance. Also, the values of the projected decision variables
are lower (or higher values for the indexation of pensions) than in the case
where only one decision variable is involved.
2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
This section ﬁrst adds expected and unexpected shocks into our analysis in
order to see how the fund absorbs these eﬀects. Second, a sensitivity analysis
of diﬀerent levels of investment rate (J), growth rate of salaries (g) and dif-
ferent percentages of the contribution base to calculate the initial pension are
analysed. From now on, the three decision variables (contribution rate, cn, age
of normal retirement, x(r)n , and indexation of pensions, n) are projected.
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Expected shocks
In the case of expected shocks, we assume that these are known at the start
of the study. As an example, for the ageing population structure, we consider
a speciﬁc cohort with a lower life expectancy,24 which translates into fewer
pensioners at the end of our study period. Figure 2.5 shows how, under the
symmetric case, the surplus resulting from a lower expenditure on pensions
is redistributed through a decrease in the contribution rate (Figure 2.5a) and
age of normal retirement (Figure 2.5b), and an increase in the indexation of
pensions (Figure 2.5c). However, under the asymmetric design, no surpluses
are re-distributed and as a result of this, the value of the accumulated fund is
higher. Also, the contribution rate and the age of normal retirement remain
at their maximum value and the indexation of pension at the minimum.
Table 2.1 shows, for the ageing population structure, the diﬀerence between the
forecast of the decision variables with and without shocks for the symmetric
scenario using the idea of the speciﬁc cohort with a lower life expectancy.
The age of normal retirement needs to increase 0.862 years under symmetric
design at the end of the study compared with the scenario without shocks. As
expected, the value of the accumulated fund at the end of the study is equal
in the presence of a shock. That is because, under the symmetric scenario, the
model redistributes any surpluses that may arise.
Table 2.2 shows for the ageing population structure the diﬀerence between the
forecast without and with shocks for the asymmetric scenario using the idea
of a cohort with a lower life expectancy. As can be seen, the diﬀerence occurs
in the indexation of pensions and in the age of retirement after year 12. The
24We consider that a cohort has two years less life expectancy than the others.
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Table 2.1: Diﬀerence between forecasts of the decision variables (contribution rate cn, age of
normal retirement x(r)n and indexation of pensions n) with shock of a speciﬁc cohort with a
lower life expectancy and without shock under the ageing population for the symmetric case.
Year cn x(r)n n F Year cn x(r)n n F
2012 0 0 0 0 2023 0 0.1% -0.7% 23.0
2013 0 0 -0.3% 0.2 2024 0 2.5% -0.7% 28.3
2014 0 0 -0.5% 0.6 2025 0 15.8% -0.8% 35.4
2015 0 0 -0.5% 1.5 2026 0 29.1% -0.9% 44.5
2016 0 0 -0.6% 2.6 2027 0 42.5% -1.0% 55.7
2017 0 0 -0.5% 4.2 2028 0 44.8% -1.0% 68.7
2018 0 0 -0.5% 6.1 2029 0 44.8% -1.1% 83.3
2019 0 0 -0.6% 8.5 2030 0.8% 86.2% -1.2% 41.4
2020 0 0 -0.6% 11.3 2031 1.8% 86.2% -1.2% 2.3
2021 0 0 -0.7% 14.7 2032 2.5% 86.2% -1.2% -36.3
2022 0 0 -0.6% 18.5 2033 2.5% 86.2% -1.2% 0
Note: The value of the Fund (F) is in thousands.
Figure 2.5: Expected shock for the symmetric (solid line) and asymmetric (dashed line):
cohort with lower life expectancy.
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value of the fund is lower in the presence of shocks as that amount is used to
absorb the changes of the system.
Table 2.2: Diﬀerence between forecasts of the decision variables (contribution rate cn, age of
normal retirement x(r)n and indexation of pensions n) with shock of a speciﬁc cohort with a
lower life expectancy and without shock under the ageing population for the asymmetric case.
Year cn x(r)n n F Year cn x(r)n n F
2012 0 0 0 0 2023 0 0.1% -0.5% 21.8
2013 0 0 -0.3% 0.2 2024 0 2.5% -0.5% 26.5
2014 0 0 -0.5% 0.6 2025 0 1.58% -0.5% 32.5
2015 0 0 -0.5% 1.5 2026 0 29.1% -0.5% 40.1
2016 0 0 -0.5% 2.6 2027 0 4.25% -0.5% 49.5
2017 0 0 -0.5% 4.1 2028 0 44.8% -0.5% 59.7
2018 0 0 -0.5% 6.1 2029 0 44.8% -0.5% 70.9
2019 0 0 -0.5% 8.4 2030 0 44.8% -0.5% 20.07
2020 0 0 -0.5% 11.1 2031 0 44.8% -0.5% -34.8
2021 0 0 -0.5% 14.3 2032 0 44.8% -0.5% -94.0
2022 0 0 -0.5% 17.8 2033 0 44.8% -0.5% -85.3
Note: The value of the Fund (F) is in thousands.
Unexpected shocks
We assume that the total number of contributors suddenly decreases25 (we
suppose a constant 20 per cent less contributors) after year 10. In this case,
the model re-calculates the optimal path of the decision variables from year
10 to the end of the study. As we can see in Figure 2.6, the contribution
rate increases after being stable for 2 years whereas the indexation of pensions
decreases from 0.74 to -2.0 per cent and the age of normal retirement increases
25The sudden decrease of the number of contributors is more common than we thought
and can occur in ﬁnancial crisis, war periods, and pandemic diseases, among others. For
example, Osterholm (2005) state that if we translate the rate of death associated with the
1918 inﬂuenza virus to that in the current population, there could be 1.7 million deaths in
the United States and 180 million to 360 million deaths globally. Furthermore, according
with Duguay (2006) despite what most people believe, young adults were the worst aﬀected
group. In Spain, owing to the ﬁnancial crisis the unemployment rate increases from 8 per
cent in 2006 to around 25 per cent in 2012.
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to of 67.5. In this case no surpluses arise that can be redistributed, and
therefore both symmetric and asymmetric cases provide the same forecasts for
the decision variables. Figure 2.6d shows how the fund absorbs this kind of
shock.
Figure 2.6: Unexpected shock: number of contributors suddenly decreases.
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Different levels of investment rate (J) for the buffer fund
Figure 2.7 show the results of the diﬀerence of the values for the decision
variables between the investment rate in the buﬀer fund of 3 per cent compared
with two diﬀerent levels, 1 per cent (solid) and 5 per cent (dashes and dots)
under symmetric scenario (black line) whereas Figure 2.8 show the results for
the asymmetric design (grey line) for the ageing population when we forecast
simultaneously the three decision variables, i.e. the results of cn(J = 3%)  
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cn(J = q); x
(r)
n (J = 3%)   x(r)n (J = q); n(J = 3%)   n(J = q); with q = 1
per cent and 5 per cent.
Figures 2.7a and 2.8a show the diﬀerence in level of the contribution rate. As
can be seen, the diﬀerence is zero in all cases, so the investment rate does not
aﬀect the contribution rate when the three decision variables are simultane-
ously projected. However, the indexation and age of retirement are aﬀected
but in a very small amount. For the age of normal retirement (Figures 2.7b
and 2.8b) the changes are between -0.0006 and 0.00005 and for the indexa-
tion of pensions (Figures 2.7c and 2.8c) are between -0.0045 and 0.003 under
the symmetric and asymmetric design. So we can say that the results of the
three decision variables under two diﬀerent levels of investment rate remain
almost the same than with an investment rate of 3 per cent. The fund (Figures
2.7d and 2.8d) presents a small change in the long-term comparing with the
previous results, when the investment rate is 5 per cent the fund tends to ac-
cumulates more and vice versa, however, for the asymmetric scenario (Figure
2.8d) of the investment rate of 1 per cent the fund at the end accumulate more
money than the fund under 3 per cent, this is due to the fact that the indexa-
tion and retirement age need to increase more in the ﬁrst years and under the
asymmetric design the system cannot redistribute the surpluses obtained for
this faster increase.
Different levels of growth of salaries (g)
This subsection considers diﬀerent levels of growth of salaries (g) equal to 1.5
and 3.5 per cent respectively (Figure 2.9-symmetric design- and Figure 2.10-
asymmetric design-) and compare the results with the growth of salaries at 2.5
per cent.
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Figure 2.7: Diﬀerences of the values of the decision variables. Base scenario (J=3%) versus
an investment rate of 1% (solid) and 5% (dots and dashes) under symmetric (black) design.
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The results show cn(g = 2:5%) cn(g = q); x(r)n (g = 2:5%) x(r)n (g = q); n(g =
2:5%)   n(g = q); with q = 1:5 per cent and 3:5 per cent. The contribution
rate and age of retirement stabilise at the same level, no change is observed.
As in the case of the investment rate sensitivity analysis, the contribution
rate (Figures 2.9a and 2.10a) does not suﬀer any change. The age of normal
retirement (Figures 2.9b and 2.10b) has very minor modiﬁcations that are in
the range of -0.00055 and 0.0001.
The indexation of pensions (Figures 2.9c and 2.10c) is the variable that is
more aﬀected but again at minimum levels. The diﬀerence from the case of
the growth of salaries of 2.5 per cent goes from -0.01 and 0.015. However, the
fund (Figures 2.9d and 2.10d) converges almost to the same at the end of the
study, showing diﬀerences that are nearly zero except for the asymmetric case
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Figure 2.8: Diﬀerences of the values of the decision variables. Base scenario (J = 3%) versus
an investment rate of 1% (solid) and 5% (dots and dashes) under asymmetric (grey) design.
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(Figure 2.10d) under the growth rate of 1.5 per cent that accumulates more
surpluses owing to a faster decrease of the indexation of pensions comparing
with the growth of salaries if 2.5 per cent.
Different levels of contribution base
In this subsection we analyse diﬀerent percentage levels of the average contri-
bution base to calculate the initial pension. Instead of having a 60 per cent of
the contribution base as the initial pension we set it at 50 per cent or 70 per
cent. The results are shown in Figure 2.11 for the symmetric design and Figure
2.12 for the asymmetric. For the contribution rate (Figures 2.11a and 2.12a)
the change occurs when the percentage of the contribution base is set at 50
per cent. The contribution level under the symmetric and asymmetric scenario
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Figure 2.9: Diﬀerences of the values of the decision variables. Base scenario (g=2.5%) versus
a salary growth rate of 1.5% (solid) and 3.5% (dots and dashes) under symmetric (black)
design.
5 10 15 20
year
Co
nt
rib
u
tio
n 
(/1
00
)
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
(a) Contribution rate
5 10 15 20
year
Ag
e 
(/1
00
)
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
(b) Age of retirement
5 10 15 20
year
In
de
xa
tio
n 
(/1
00
)
−2
−1
0
1
2
(c) Indexation of pensions
5 10 15 20
year
Fu
nd
 (x
 10
00
)
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
20
(d) Fund
is lower comparing with the initial pension of 60 per cent of the contribution
base by no more than 0.02. The age of retirement suﬀers modiﬁcation under
the asymmetric scenario at an initial pension of 70 per cent of the contribution
base, the values increase slowly than the values under the initial pension of
60 per cent owing to a faster decrease of the indexation of pension (Figure
2.11c and 2.12c). However, the age of retirement under the initial pension
of 70 per cent converges to the same value as under an initial pension of 60
per cent. Again, under both designs, symmetric (Figures 2.11c and 2.12c)
and asymmetric, minimum modiﬁcations occur in the indexation of pensions,
the diﬀerences are situated between -0.015 and 0.030 with respect an initial
pension of 60 per cent. The surpluses or deﬁcits of the fund are consistent
with what we expected. Under an initial pension of 50 per cent of the average
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Figure 2.10: Diﬀerences of the values of the decision variables. Base scenario (g = 2:5%)
versus a salary growth rate of 1.5% (solid) and 3.5% (dots and dashes) under asymmetric
(grey) design.
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contribution base the fund accumulates less money than under the 60 per cent
of initial pension and under 70 per cent accumulates more because the system
has higher payments of beneﬁts and so the fund needs to have more surpluses
to cover them.
2.4 Conclusions
In social security reforms there is no only one way to proceed and each coun-
try has developed its own model. However, it is clear that any solution
chosen should meet at least two requirements: ﬁnancial and social viability
(Sales-Sarrapy, Solis-Soberon, & Villagomez-Amezcua (1998)). The aim of
this proposed automatic balancing mechanism is to re-establish the liquidity
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Figure 2.11: Diﬀerences of the values for the decision variables. Base scenario (initial pension
of 60% of the average contribution base) versus a 50% (solid) and 70% (dots and dashes)
under symmetric (black) design.
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of PAYGO pension systems without the repeated intervention of the legisla-
tors. This chapter extends the ideas ﬁrst proposed by Haberman & Zimbidis
(2002b) and Pantelous & Zimbidis (2008) and develops a model for the opti-
mal non-linear problem in a pension scheme including the indexation of the
pensions as an additional estimated variable.
The model presented in this chapter could be an alternative to the traditional
parametric reforms of the PAYGO systems around the world. We obtained,
for two diﬀerent population structures (an ageing and a mature), an optimal
level of the contingency fund given an optimal growth of the contribution rate,
age of normal retirement and indexation of pensions based on an annual in-
terest rate of 3 per cent. We show that the contribution rate, age of normal
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Figure 2.12: Diﬀerences of the values for the decision variables. Base scenario (initial pension
of 60% of the average contribution base) versus a 50% (solid) and 70% (dots and dashes)
under asymmetric (grey) design.
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retirement and indexation stabilises at the end of the period of analysis. Fur-
thermore, we show under diﬀerent investment and salary growth rates and
percentages of the average contribution base to calculate the initial pension,
that the contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions suﬀer
very minor modiﬁcation. We can conclude that the model presented converges
to similar values at the end of the study under diﬀerent scenarios in our sen-
sitivity analysis. The results are completely consistent with the theoretical
analysis that we could expect. The contingency fund absorbs the ﬂuctuation
of the demographic patterns and the economic variables involved. In contrast
with a quadratic objective, the introduction of the logarithmic function as the
objective function allows us to analyse and choose between two designs: the
symmetric and the asymmetric one. With the model presented we can con-
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clude that an ABM not necessarily needs only to increase the key variables
in a pension system, but also under the symmetric scenario, the fund could
redistribute the surpluses to the active workers and pensioners relaxing the
political diﬃculties that the legislators could face when implementing the re-
form. On the other hand, the asymmetric scenario allows the government to
accumulate ﬁnancial reserves in case of any unexpected shocks.
When we ﬁrst establish an ABM of this type, we need to set up the number of
projection variables to be included. The main advantages of a mechanism of
this type is to guide the system back onto the road to long-term liquidity and
at the same time to automate the measures to be taken, isolating them from
the political arena, avoiding any delay and lack of time perspective. However,
this ABM also allows some ﬂexibility in the sense that the number of variables
to be projected can be changed to adapt the system to a speciﬁc situation. At
the same time, it is also possible to impose more restrictions to the model to
keep, for example, the normal retirement age or the contribution rate constant
during some years, making the ABM more applicable in practice.
Planning a smooth sequence of change in the key variables of a pension plan
requires involving several aspects at the same time. Nevertheless, the model
presented in this chapter involves most of them, an inter-temporal budget
pension constraint (the contingency fund); an objective function that allows us
to forecast the contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions
without the restrictions that a quadratic loss function has; the forecast of the
population; the ﬂexibility of the policy maker to choose how many parameters
want to include; and ﬁnally, the recalibration of the parameters with the ABM.
3
Optimal strategies for pay-as-you-go
pension ﬁnance: A sustainability
framework
Godínez Olivares, H., Boado-Penas, M.C., and Haberman, S. 1
The aim of this chapter is to design an automatic balancing mechanism to restore
the sustainability of a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) pension system based on changes
in its main variables, such as the contribution rate, normal retirement age and
indexation of pensions. Using nonlinear optimisation, this mechanism, identiﬁes
and applies an optimal path of these variables to a PAYGO system in the long run
and absorbs ﬂuctuations in longevity, fertility rates, salary growth or any other
events in a pension system.
Keywords: optimisation; pay-as-you-go; public pensions; risk; sustainability.
3.1 Introduction
Public pension systems are usually ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
basis where pensions for retirees are paid by the contributions of the working-
age population. A successful PAYGO system requires a balance between the
expenditure on pensions and the income from contributions made by the active
workers over time, usually termed inter-generational solidarity.2
1This chapter is based on the paper ‘Optimal strategies for pay-as-you-go pension ﬁnance:
A sustainability framework’ by Godínez-Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Haberman (2016). In-
surance: Mathematics and Economics. 69, 117-126.
2Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b) deﬁne inter-generational solidarity as the willingness of
diﬀerent groups of people, in this case young and old generations, to participate in a
common pool sharing actual experience, including any losses emerging.
99
100 3. Optimal strategies for pay-as-you-go pension ﬁnance: A sustainability framework
Birth rates have dramatically decreased and with continuous improvements in
life expectancy, due to improved health care and medical innovations OECD
(2015), pensions are paid over a longer time horizon. This causes great diﬃ-
culties for pension ﬁnances and raises serious concerns about the sustainability
of the pay-as-you-go pension systems.
In the U.S., The 2015 Annual report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds
(OASDI) (2015) forecasts that the net present value of expenditure on pensions
exceeds the net present value from contributions through the period 2015-2089
and that there is a 50% probability of trust fund depletion by the end of
2034 under intermediate assumptions. In Europe, The European Commission
(2012b) (White Paper) and The European Commission (2010) (Green Paper)
shows a clear increase in life expectancy at birth for males and females of 7.9
and 6.5 years respectively from 2010 to 2060 and that this will cause an increase
of the pension expenditure from 10% to 12.5% of GDP in 2060.3 Furthermore,
the increase in unemployment rates, resulting from the recent global crisis,
have exerted additional stress on pension systems.
The common trend resulting from these events, that negatively aﬀect the ﬁnan-
cial health of the systems, is a wave of parametric, or even structural reforms,
by changing the formula to calculate the initial pension from a Deﬁned Beneﬁt
(DB) PAYGO to a Notional Deﬁned Contribution (NDC), with the aim of
reducing the expenditure on pensions.4
3In both papers, the age of retirement, contribution rate and indexation of pensions are
ﬁxed according to current legislation in 2010 and 2012 for the Green and White paper
respectively.
4See Whitehouse et al. (2009), Whitehouse (2009a), OECD (2012). See Holzmann et al.
(2012) for more details on NDCs.
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In this respect, Boado-Penas, Valdés-Prieto, & Vidal-Meliá (2008) warn that
some politicians, researchers and public opinion mistakenly consider the annual
cash-ﬂow deﬁcit or surplus to be an indicator of the pay-as-you-go system’s
solvency or sustainability5; i.e. they confuse an annual liquidity indicator with
a sustainability indicator. An actuarial balance needs to be compiled in order
to assess whether or not a system is sustainable in the long run. The actuarial
balance, according to Barr & Diamond (2009), is necessary to have the “big
picture” of the whole system looking for explicit or implicit assets and not only
focusing on the future liabilities of the pay-as-you-go system. The actuarial
balance, Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2013), also supplies a positive incentive
to improve ﬁnancial management by eliminating or at least minimising the
traditional mismatch between relatively short-vision of both politician and
voters -often only four years- and the indeﬁnite time horizon of the system
itself.
Even though the information provided by the actuarial balance can help to
take better and more informed decisions, some countries have decided not to
use it, i.e., U.S. Other countries, without compiling any balance, have adopted
some parametric reforms via emergency modiﬁcations in legislation. In this re-
spect, Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009) and Vidal-Meliá et al. (2010) deﬁne Automatic
Balance Mechanisms (ABMs) as a set of pre-determined measures established
by law to be applied immediately as required according to a sustainability
indicator or any other indicator that reﬂects the ﬁnancial health of the sys-
tem. Its purpose, through successive application, is to re-establish the ﬁnancial
equilibrium of pay-as-you-go pension systems with the aim of making those sys-
5According to Knell et al. (2006), the term sustainability has many deﬁnitions, though it
almost always refers to the ﬁscal policies of a government, the public sector or the pension
system. On the other hand, the concept of solvency, mostly applicable in the insurance
sector, refers to the ability of a pension scheme’s assets to meet the scheme’s liabilities
indicator. Henceforth we will use the term sustainability.
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tems viable without the repeated intervention of the legislators. According to
D’Addio & Whitehouse (2012) three main automatic mechanisms can be con-
sidered for changing pension values. First, adjustments can be made in beneﬁt
levels to reﬂect changes in life expectancy; second, adjustments can be made
through revaluation of earlier years’ contribution bases and third, adjustments
may occur through the indexation of pension payments. In practice, OECD
(2012), Turner (2007) and Turner (2009) state that at least 12 countries link
the indexation of pensions to life expectancy or some other type of indicator.
It is important to highlight that Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b) and Godínez-
Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016), propose parametric reforms for
restoring the liquidity in the PAYGO pension schemes using a buﬀer fund. In
particular, Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b), using standard linearisation proce-
dures, obtain a closed solution for the optimal paths of the contribution rate
and retirement age while trying to keep these variables at the same level over
time. Godínez-Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016) propose an Auto-
matic Balance Mechanism to restore the liquidity of the system at the end of
a 20-year horizon. In this case, the authors use a logarithmic function to min-
imise the growth rate of the contribution rate, retirement age and indexation
on pensions.
In this chapter, for the very ﬁrst time according to the authors’ knowledge,
two diﬀerent automatic balancing mechanisms are developed using nonlinear
optimisation techniques to restore the sustainability over a 75-year time hori-
zon into a DB-pay-as-you-go pension system while keeping the system liquid
at all times. The functional objective function is set to guarantee that the
net present value of the income from contributions is suﬃcient to cover the
pension expenditure in the long run.
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Following this introduction, the next section of the chapter describes the
methodology to compile the actuarial balance with the aim of assessing the
sustainability of the system. The third section describes the optimisation tech-
niques in a pay-as-you-go pension system and the mathematical preliminaries
together with the main notation and deﬁnitions. Section 3.4 describes the
two Automatic Balance Mechanisms proposed to guarantee the sustainability
into a PAYGO pension scheme. Section 3.5 shows a representative application
given a population structure and suggests how an ABM should be designed
for both symmetric and asymmetric cases. Section 3.6 concludes and makes
suggestions for further research.
3.2 The actuarial balance (AB)
The paper by Plamondon et al. (2002) is a ﬁrst attempt to conceptualise the
actuarial balance of the PAYGO system deﬁned as the diﬀerence between an
income rate and a cost rate computed over various periods. In our case, this is
related to the Sustainability mechanism deﬁned in section 3.4.1. In the same
line, Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2013)6 and Billig & Ménard (2013) describe
the diﬀerent types of actuarial balance for the pay-as-you-go pension systems.
According to Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2013), the main methodology used
to compile the actuarial balance in nonﬁnancial Deﬁned Beneﬁt systems could
be described as an aggregate accounting projection model that compares the
net present value (NPV) of the expenditure on pensions and the income from
contributions, in a long time horizon.
6This paper also includes the methodology of the actuarial balance sheet, in the accounting
sense of the term, that is used in the Swedish notional pension system.
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This kind of actuarial balance uses a forecast demographic scenario to deter-
mine the future evolution of the number of contributors and pensioners ac-
cording to the rules of the pension system. The macroeconomic scenario that
determines the amounts of future contributions and pensions is exogenous.
In practice, the actuarial balance (AB) at time zero is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the NPV of future contributions valued at zero and the NPV of future
pension beneﬁts valued at zero.
In practice, allowing for particular diﬀerences between countries, actuarial
balances are compiled, on a regular basis, in countries such as U.S, Japan
or Canada, amongst others. The actuarial balance of the U.S. social secu-
rity programs (The 2015 Annual report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds
(OASDI) (2015)), is aimed at measuring the system’s ﬁnancial solvency over
a 75 year time horizon. In Japan, the Actuarial Aﬀairs Division of the Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2009) compiles an actuarial balance at
least every ﬁve years with a 95-year time7 that includes an automatic balanc-
ing mechanism to make the system sustainable in such horizon of time.8 In
Canada, actuarial valuation reports on the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) are
prepared by the Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary (2012) every three years. These
reports determine a minimum contribution rate and show projections of the
Plan’s contributions, expenditures and assets for the next 75 years.9
7The U.S and Japanese actuarial balances include the ﬁnancial assets (buﬀer fund) at the
beginning of the valuation period and also the level of the fund that reaches a magnitude
of one-year’s expenditure at the end of the time horizon.
8A modiﬁed indexation is applied to both the revaluation of the contribution bases and
pensions in payment. It takes into account both improvements in life expectancy and
population increases (or decreases).
9Each actuarial valuation report is based on a number of best-estimate assumptions that
reﬂect the judgement of the Chief Actuary of the CPP as to future demographic and
economic conditions.
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After compiling an actuarial balance, the next section presents the nonlinear
optimisation model for two diﬀerent types of Automatic Balance Mechanisms,
to restore the sustainability into the system, involving changes in the contri-
bution rate, retirement age and indexation on pensions.
3.3 Optimisation techniques in a PAYGO pension sys-
tem
This section presents the optimisation10 techniques used to calculate the op-
timal and smooth paths of the variables involved in the PAYGO system such
as the contribution rate, the age of normal retirement and the indexation of
pensions. We extend the optimisation model developed by Godínez-Olivares,
Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016) which focused only on the liquidity of the
system in a 20-year time horizon. In this chapter, we are particularly inter-
ested in ﬁnding the optimal paths of the key variables that guarantee not
only the short run equilibrium (liquidity in the system) but also the long-run
sustainability of the pension ﬁnance.
In a general nonlinear optimisation problem (NLO)11 the functions and pa-
rameters involved are:
a The decision variables represented by fdgn = fd0n; d1n; :::; dvng 2 D; where
D 2 <n is the decision space, n is the step of the process with n 2 N
and v is the number of variables included in d. Speciﬁcally in this model
10Optimisation techniques are extensively used in economics in the intertemporal consump-
tion context (see for example, Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (1996), Wilcoxen (1989), Walde (2010)).
However, there are not many application on pensions systems (see for example, Devolder,
Bosch Princep, & Dominguez Fabian (2002), Feldstein & Liebman (2010), Haberman &
Vigna (2002a), Roberts (2002) and Sayan & Kiraci (2001)).
11For more details see Bertsekas (1999) and Bertsekas (2005).
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djn = (c
j
n; x
(r)j
n ; jn) where fcgn2N is the contribution rate, fx(r)gn2N is the
age of retirement, fgn2N is the indexation of pensions; and n is the year;
b A function fn(djn; n), that is called, the objective function of the NLO.
In our case, fn(djn; n) is expressed by a minimisation function;
c The set of feasible solutions F = fdjn 2 Djhk(djn) = 0; k =
1; :::l and gj(D)  0; j = 1; 2; :::mg; where hk for k = 1; :::l repre-
sent l linear constraints and gj for j = 1; :::;m represent m nonlinear
constraints. In our model, following the ideas introduced by Godínez-
Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016), the constraints are deﬁned
by the upper and lower bounds and change of rates of the key variables
at time n and also by the liquidity restrictions, and;
d If d minimises (or maximises) f , then d is called an optimal solution
of the NLO. If F = ; then the NLO is not feasible, i.e., there are no d
that minimises (or maximises) the objective function.
Following Godínez-Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016), we applied the
Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG) algorithm to ﬁnd the optimal path of
the variables. This iterative method allows us to ﬁnd the optimal solution of
the NLO. The GRG is the extension of the gradient method to constrained and
bounded optimisation problems. It was ﬁrst developed by Abadie & Carpen-
ter (1969) and is still today one of the most powerful nonlinear optimisation
algorithms.12
In practice, building the model (modelling phase) is as important and some-
times more diﬃcult than the solving phase (Nemirovski (1999)). The modelling
12See, for example, Kallrath (1999), Bazaraa, Sheraldi, & Shetly (1993) and Wright (1996).
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phase, i.e. the formulation of the Automatic Balance Mechanism, is discussed
in the following section.
3.4 Automatic Balancing Mechanism (ABMs) to restore
sustainability
This section presents two diﬀerent designs of Automatic Balance Mechanisms
to restore both the liquidity and sustainability of a pay-as-you-go pension
system to ﬁnd the optimal path for the decision variables -contribution rate,
age of normal retirement and indexation of pensions- in a PAYGO pension
scheme.
The ﬁrst Automatic Balance Mechanism (Sustainability ABM) restores the
system’s sustainability measured via the actuarial balance as the diﬀerence
between the net present value of the future income from contributions and
the expenditure on pensions in the long run. The second Automatic Balance
Mechanism (Sustainability ABM with fund) takes into account the accumulated
value of the ﬁnancial assets (buﬀer fund) emerging from the diﬀerence between
the income from contributions and expenditure on pensions in each year.
The next subsections describe how the two diﬀerent Automatic Balance Mech-
anisms are built.
3.4.1 Sustainability ABM
The optimisation function, fn(djn; n), to minimise for the Sustainability ABM
for a time horizon N , subject to some constraints, is as follows:
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(3.1)
where:
cn is the contribution rate during year n; Wn(gn; x(r)n ) is the total contribution
base13 paid at n that depends on the growth of salaries gn and the retirement
age at n, x(r)n ; Bn is the total expenditure on pensions at n that depends on
gn, x(r)n , and the indexation of pensions at n, n;  > 0 is the discount rate.
cmin; x
(r)
min; min 2 < and cmax; x(r)max; max 2 < are lower and upper bounds
of the decision variables respectively. These bounds are set in order to avoid
possible unrealistic changes in the key variables of the pension system.
Smooth constraints are also necessary to prevent jumps in path of the con-
tribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions. Mathematically,
smooth constraints are set as: c1  cn+1
cn
 c2;x(r)1 
x
(r)
n+1
x
(r)
n
 x(r)2;1 
n+1
n
 2
where c1; c2; x(r)1; x(r)2; 1; 2 2 <.
Finally, the liquidity restriction cnWn(gn; x(r)n )  Bn(gn; x(r)n ; n) for all n is
imposed to ensure that the income from contributions at n covers the annual
expenditure on pensions. Consequently, the liquidity indicator that measures
13The contribution base of the system is deﬁned as the total wages of the working population.
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the liquidity of the system, taking only into account the income from contri-
butions and the expenditure of pensions is deﬁned as:
Ln =
cnWn(gn; x
(r)
n )
Bn(gn; x
(r)
n ; n)
(3.2)
Since  > 0 and thanks to the liquidity restriction, the optimal solution for
this Automatic Balance Mechanism built by equation 3.1 should be zero.14
However, it is well-known that in practice it is not possible to have an exact
equilibrium for the valuation problem, and that is the reason for minimising
the diﬀerence between the income from contributions and the expenditure on
pensions.
3.4.2 An alternative design for the Sustainability ABM (Sustainability
ABM with fund)
The amount of the buﬀer fund, Fn, or even the returns that it generates, might
have a positive eﬀect on a pension system facing unexpected changes in the
demographic or economic projections. For example, the returns generated by
the buﬀer fund in Spain covered the shortfall in contributions during 2010
(of State for Social Security. (2011)). With this in mind, the Sustainability
ABM with fund, that includes the accumulation of the fund over time, can be
expressed as:
Fn = (1 + Jn)Fn 1 + cnWn(gn; x(r)n ) Bn(gn; x(r)n ; n); (3.3)
14Under the current adverse demographic scenario, it will be necessary to make adjustments
in the key variables in order to ensure sustainability of the system in the long run. A value
higher than zero would mean that changes to the key variables would be even harsher to
the individual members of the pension system. On the other hand, a value lower than
zero would require assumptions to be made with respect to the interest rate and that are
outside of the scope of this chapter.
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where Jn is the return15 of the fund during year n. The variable Fn ﬂuctuates
deliberately to absorb changes in fertility, mortality projections and any other
events that might aﬀect the liquidity and sustainability indicator in the pension
system.
In contrast to the Automatic Balance Mechanism built by equation 3.1, the
Sustainability ABM with fund is focused on the minimisation of the present
value of the buﬀer fund. The objective function to minimise, subject to some
constraints, is as follows:
mincnxn;n
NX
n=0
Fn(cn; gn; x
(r)
n ; n; Jn)
(1 + )n
s:t: =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
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x
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n+1
x
(r)
n
 x(r)2;
1  n+1
n
 2;
Fn  0
(3.4)
The same constraints for the contribution rate, the age of retirement and the
indexation of pensions as in the Sustainability ABM (eq. 3.1) are imposed.
However, the liquidity constraint is now set as Fn  0; for all n, to ensure
liquidity in the system.
Under the Sustainability ABM with fund, the natural liquidity indicator that
emerges from the objective function and takes into account the accumulated
value of the buﬀer fund is expressed as follows:
15According to Yermo (2008) one of the most remarkable aspects of the regulatory environ-
ment of the reserve funds surveyed is that with the exception of Ireland, Japan, Korea, and
Sweden, there are no major investment limitations. The study of the diﬀerent investment
strategies is out of the scope of this chapter, therefore our analysis assumes a risk-free
investment rate as in the case of the United States, Belgium and Spain.
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Lfn =
(1 + Jn)Fn 1 + cnWn(gn; x
(r)
n )
Bn(gn; x
(r)
n ; n)
(3.5)
The same liquidity indicator as for the Sustainability ABM (without the inclu-
sion of the buﬀer fund eq. 3.2), can be calculated but, under the Sustainability
ABM with fund model, we cannot guarantee that its value would be higher
than or equal to one.
3.4.3 Symmetric and asymmetric designs for the Sustainability ABM
and the alternative design (Sustainability ABM with fund)
Most of parametric reforms are based on the general view that expenditure
on pensions is increasing, based on an increase in life expectancy, and/or on
the fact that the amount of the buﬀer fund is decreasing. In this respect,
Automatic Balance Mechanisms are designed to face adverse demographic and
economic changes (asymmetric ABM), but these could also be designed to
beneﬁt the system’s participants in good times.
Palmer (2013) states that under a symmetric Automatic Balance Mechanism,
any surplus (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the income from contributions
and the expenditure on pensions at n) that might arise would be automatically
distributed. In the absence of a symmetric ABM, an undistributed surplus is
maintained in the system. Furthermore, Alho et al. (2013) state that the bal-
ancing mechanism can be symmetric, adjusting for both positive and negative
deviations from the ﬁnancial health indicator. Analytically, for the asymmet-
ric case the change in the contribution rate and age of normal retirement are
enforced to be strictly greater or equal to zero (strictly lower or equal to zero
for the indexation of pensions).
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In our model, under the symmetric design, our ABMs determine whether the
contribution rate, the age of normal retirement (and indexation of pensions) are
reduced (increased) when the system has a surplus and increased (decreased)
in periods of deﬁcit. Analytically, relative changes in the contribution rate
and age of normal retirement are enforced to be strictly greater or equal to
one (strictly lower or equal to one for the indexation of pensions) under the
asymmetric design. In contrast, under the symmetric case, the rate of change
in the variables could be positive or negative.
3.5 Numerical Example
This section presents a numerical example using the ABMs deﬁned by the
optimisation problems 3.1 and 3.4 developed in Section 3.4. First, the main
data and assumptions are presented, secondly the results are discussed and
ﬁnally this section provides a sensitivity analysis of the results.
3.5.1 Data
• We use the demographic structure of the European population (Figure
3.1a) from 2013 to 2087 obtained from Eurostat.16 It can be seen that the
peak of population in 2013 (Figure 3.1a, grey pyramid) is at ages 40-50
in 2013, corresponding to the demographic boom in the 1960s and early
1970s. By 2087, there are no clear peaks in the population. Also, the age-
dependency ratio17, decreases over time, with 3.63 contributor ﬁnancing
16Data obtained from Eurostat Database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, accessed 1 March
2015.
17This ratio measures the number of elderly people relative to those of working age. It is
calculated as the number of contributors divided by the number of pensioners.
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one pensioner in 2013 to 1.94 in 2087 as shown in Figure 3.1b. For
comparison purposes the demographic structure has been normalised.18
• The European salary and pension structures over time have been used.19
• The salaries (gn = g) are assumed to increase at an annual constant rate
of 2.5%20 while the buﬀer fund is assumed to increase at an annual rate
(Jn) of 3%21.
• The initial pension is set at 55% of ﬁnal salary22 and Px;n can be written
as:
Px;n = Px 1;n 1  (1 + n 1);
where P
x
(r)
n ;n
= P
x
(r)
n ;n
1fx(r)n ;n=1g + Px(r)n ;n  (1 + g)n1fx(r)n ;n>1g:
• The lower bounds for the contribution rate, age of normal retirement
and indexation of pensions are given respectively by 15%, 65 and -5%;
the upper bounds are 20%, 7023 and 5% respectively.
• For smooth changes, it is also assumed that the change in the contribu-
tion rate varies between 0.3% and 0.7%, the age of normal retirement
between 1.5 and 4 months and the indexation of pensions between -0.5%
and 0.5%. These values are in line with the most important reforms in
18The normalisation rescales data values of the population per age to a new range of values
between zero and one.
19Data obtained from Eurostat Database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat accessed 1 March
2015. The salary structure, shown in Figure 3.1c, has been normalised to allow compar-
isons.
20Average growth of the hourly labour costs in Europe from 2004 to 2014. Data obtained
from Eurostat Database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, accessed 1 March 2015.
21This value, which is used for the Sustainability ABM with fund, is in line with the average
value of the Euribor rates during the last 15 years.
22According to Creighton (2014), this level is in line with the average replacement rate which
measures the pension as a percentage of a worker’s pre-retirement income.
23As shown in the results, the optimal solutions would never reach this upper bound. There-
fore, setting up a higher value would not modify our results.
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the 34 OECD member countries24 between January 2009 and September
2013.
• No unemployment is considered in our analysis.
Figure 3.1: Normalised European population structure in 2013 (grey) and 2087 (transparent),
evolution of the age-dependency ratio, and salary structure in 2013.
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24See OECD (2014).
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3.5.2 Results
Figure 3.2 shows the optimal paths25 for the Sustainability ABM when the
three decision variables (contribution rate, retirement age and indexation of
pensions) are modiﬁed simultaneously under both the asymmetric (base case)
and symmetric cases. Under both cases, the contribution rate (Figure 3.2a)
stabilises at 19%, and only from 2060 to 2064 is the contribution rate lower
under the symmetric design. At the same time, the age of normal retirement
(Figure 3.2b) stabilises at 67.5 under both scenarios, although for the sym-
metric case the retirement age is lower than under the asymmetric design from
2055 to 2077. The indexation of pensions (Figure 3.2c) stabilises at -1%26 at
the end of the period of analysis. The liquidity indicator, deﬁned as the ratio
of the income from contributions to the expenditure on pensions at every year,
stabilises around one. The diﬀerence between the symmetric and asymmetric
cases is explained by the population structure: the age-dependency ratio (Fig-
ure 3.1b) shows a small blip in the projected ratio between 2058 and 2069, i.e.
there are more active workers to ﬁnance the pensioners.
25For both ABMs the optimal solutions found are local minimums, however, as the initial
values for the decision variables are close to the real values, the local minimums are the
best solutions.
26When a lower bound of the indexation of pensions is set to zero percent, the Sustainability
ABM stabilises at 21% for the contribution rate, 68.44 for the retirement age and 0% for
the indexation of pensions; the Sustainability ABM with fund, stabilises at 20.45%, 68 and
0% respectively. In practice, some PAYGO pension systems (i.e. Sweden (The Swedish
Pension System (2015))) have already adopted a negative indexation to make its pension
system sustainable in the long run. For this reason, we allow for a negative indexation
(with a lower bound of -5%) to keep a more general setting.
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Figure 3.2: Results of Sustainability ABM when the three variables are projected
simultaneously for the symmetric (black line) and asymmetric (grey line) with European
population structure.
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Figure 3.3 shows the results of the Sustainability ABM with fund, which is the
modiﬁed Automatic Balance Mechanism that takes into account the amount
of ﬁnancial assets of the system. Under this design, the optimal paths of
the contribution rate, age of normal retirement (and indexation of pensions)
are expected to take lower (higher) values than for the Sustainability ABM
design. Figure 3.3 shows that, under the symmetric design (black line), the
contribution rate (Figure 3.3a) needs to increase to 19%, as in the Sustainability
ABM. However, the age of normal retirement increases to 66.8 at the end of
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the study, 0.7 less than under the Sustainability ABM design. The indexation
of pensions takes the same path as for the Sustainability ABM design.
Figure 3.3: Results of the Sustainability ABM with fund when the three variables are
projected simultaneously - for the symmetric (black line) and asymmetric scenario (grey line)
with European population structure.
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(d) Liquidity indicator
Figure 3.3d shows the liquidity indicator without buﬀer fund deﬁned by eq.
(3.2) (dashed line) and including the amount of the buﬀer fund deﬁned by eq.
(3.5) (solid line) under both the symmetric (black line) and asymmetric (grey
line) designs. The liquidity indicator including buﬀer fund remains always
greater than 1, that is, the system always has enough money to cover the
expenditure on pensions in every year. However, if we do not take into account
the buﬀer fund (dashed line), the system shows a permanent deﬁcit from year
2040 onwards.
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The Automatic Balance Mechanism could also be designed around having only
one modiﬁed variable rather than having three variables that are modiﬁed
simultaneously. For the Sustainability ABM, if the contribution rate is the
only decision variable, it would need to increase to 31.43%, whereas if the
age of retirement is the only variable it would increase to 78.04 years. If the
indexation of pensions is set as the only decision variable, the beneﬁts would
decrease at an annual rate of 5.15%.
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis
This sub-section performs a sensitivity analysis for diﬀerent levels of salaries
growth (g), percentages of the contribution base to calculate the initial
pension, and age-dependency ratios in order to see how the main variables
of the system react to these changes. From now on, only the Sustainability
ABM under an asymmetric design is analysed.27
Diﬀerent levels of growth of salaries (g)
This subsection analyses two diﬀerent levels of salary growth (g). When the
growth of salaries is 0.5%, the contribution rate stabilises at 19.7% (Figure
3.4a), that is 0.7% more than for the base scenario, whereas the retirement age
needs to increase to 68.5 (Figure 3.4b), one year more than the base scenario,
and the indexation of pension stabilises at -2.1% (Figure 3.4c), that is 1.1%
less than the base scenario.
If the growth of salaries is set at 5%, the contribution rate stabilises at 16.7%,
2.3% lower than the base scenario with a salary growth of 2.5%, the age of
27The results for the Sustainability ABM with fund are not presented since the conclusions
drawn are very similar to the Sustainability ABM.
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retirement stabilises at 66.3, that is 1.2 years below the base scenario, whereas
the indexation of pensions stabilises at -0.4%, that is 0.6% more than the base
scenario.
The liquidity of the system (Figure 3.4d) follows a similar path for the diﬀerent
growth of salary analysed. The increase from 2058 to 2070 corresponds to the
increase in the age-dependency ratio shown in the demographic projections.
As the liquidity of the system is always greater than 1, it is possible to conclude
that the objective of the Automatic Balance Mechanism is achieved.
Figure 3.4: Results of the Sustainability ABM under diﬀerent levels of growth of salaries:
0.5% (grey), 5% (black) and base scenario (dashed).
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Diﬀerent percentage levels of the initial pension
This subsection analyses diﬀerent percentage levels of initial pension, specif-
ically the initial pension is set at 40% or 70% of the contribution base. The
contribution rate (Figure 3.5a) stabilises at 17% and 19.6% respectively, in-
stead of 19% for the base case scenario. The age of normal retirement stabilises
at age 66 and 68.5 respectively, while it stabilises at 67 under the base scenario.
The value of the indexation of pensions stabilises at -0.45% and -1.75% for
a 40% and 70% of the contribution base respectively. The liquidity of the
system is maintained around one for the whole of the period analysed; thus,
the target of the Automatic Balance Mechanism is achieved with these levels
of contribution base.
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Figure 3.5: Results of the Sustainability ABM under diﬀerent levels of initial pension: 40%
(grey), 70% (black) and base scenario (dashed).
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Diﬀerent levels of age-dependency ratio
A lower (higher) level of the age-dependency ratio translates into a smaller
or greater number of pensioners in our study.28 When the age-dependency
ratio (grey line) is 10% lower (Figure 3.6a), the contribution rate stabilises
below the base case scenario by 0.6%, the age of retirement (Figure 3.6b) by
0.5 years and the indexation of pensions above by 0.41%. Whereas, when the
age-dependency ratio increases by 10% , the contribution rate and the age of
28The constant increase or decrease in the age-dependency ratio aﬀects all ages by the same
percentage.
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retirement are higher by 0.5% and 0.5 years respectively with respect to the
base scenario. The indexation of pensions (Figure 3.6c) is lower by 0.20%.
In this case, the liquidity of the system (Figure 3.6d) is obtained and, again,
from 2058 to 2069 the system shows a surplus owing to the given demographic
structure during these years.
Figure 3.6: Results of the Sustainability ABM under diﬀerent levels of age-dependency ratio:
-10% (grey), +10% (black) and base scenario (dashed).
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This sub-section has shown how the three sensitivities presented (diﬀerent
levels of growth of salaries (g), percentage of the levels of the initial pension
and levels of age-dependency ratio) are all in the expected direction. It is also
remarkable that, even in the most optimistic scenario, the key variables will
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need to be adjusted to guarantee the sustainability of the system in the long
run.
3.6 Conclusions
Restoring the long-term sustainability of a Pay-As-You-Go pension system is
on the agenda for most governments. The expenditure on pensions is increasing
in line with the increase in longevity, the forecasts for the ageing of the baby-
boom generation and any other random events that negatively aﬀect to the
ﬁnancial health of the system. At the same time, the income from contributions
does not increase at the same rate mainly due to the decline in the fertility
rates.
Social security decisions to restore the sustainability usually involve politi-
cal risk in the sense that the horizon of the policymakers is less than that
of the system itself. This chapter aims to provide a solution to restore the
long-term sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system using automatic balancing
mechanisms, isolating the measures to be taken from the political arena. Using
optimisation techniques, the Automatic Balance Mechanisms presented in this
chapter propose a theoretical framework to calculate the optimal path of the
contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions.
Some politicians, researchers and sections of public opinion mistakenly con-
sider the annual cash-ﬂow deﬁcit or surplus, that is the liquidity indicator,
to be an indicator of the PAYGO system’s sustainability. Therefore, the two
Automatic Balance Mechanisms presented in this chapter focus on restoring
the sustainability of the pension scheme while keeping the system liquid at all
times. The Automatic Balance Mechanisms built are based on minimising the
present value of future cash ﬂows (income from contributions and expenditure
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on pensions) including or not the accumulated value of the buﬀer fund of the
system.
The Automatic Balance Mechanisms presented in this chapter could be im-
plemented as an alternative to the parametric pension reforms of the pay-as-
you-go systems around the world. Parametric reforms are usually taken via
emergency modiﬁcations in legislation with the aim of re-establishing the ﬁ-
nancial equilibrium in the system. Our proposed ABM not only focuses on
the short term liquidity of the system but also on its sustainability in the long
run. The main drawback of our ABMs is that the projections of demographic,
economic and ﬁnancial variables might be far away from the real values.
The chapter also discusses two diﬀerent designs that could be implemented, the
symmetric or asymmetric design. Under the Sustainability ABM, no surpluses
are accumulated, whereas it is possible to build an alternative Automatic Bal-
ance Mechanism which includes a buﬀer fund, and accumulates ﬁnancial assets
(Sustainability ABM with fund). For both Sustainability ABM and Sustain-
ability ABM with fund mechanisms, the contribution rate and indexation of
pension stabilise at the same level, 19% and -1% respectively, whereas the age
of normal retirement, when the buﬀer fund is included (Sustainability ABM
with fund), stabilises 0.7 years below the Sustainability ABM design, i.e. 67.5
and 66.8 respectively.
This chapter shows that the sustainability of a generic pension system using
European population structure and salary proﬁle is not guaranteed in the long
run, even in the most optimistic scenario with a lower dependency ratio or an
increase in the total contribution base.
Finally, based on the model presented in this chapter, at least two important
directions for future research can be identiﬁed. First, it would be interesting
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to apply Automatic Balance Mechanisms to diﬀerent countries which have re-
cently carried out parametric reforms and assess whether these reforms have
any mathematical basis in the long run, in terms of our optimisation frame-
work. Another direction would be to make the model more representative of
the real world by means of a periodic recalibration of the optimal path of the
key variables in line with current economic and demographic projections.
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4
An alternative pension reform for Spain
based on optimisation techniques
H. Godínez Olivares and M. del C. Boado-Penas1
The aim of this chapter is to twofold: to design an alternative reform of the Spanish
contributory retirement pension system based on optimal strategies to restore
liquidity through changes in the key variables of the system (the contribution rate,
retirement age and/or indexation of pensions) and at the same time to assess the
reformed Spanish system with the focus on its liquidity in the long run. These
optimal strategies, which we call Automatic Balancing Mechanisms (ABMs),
calculate the optimal path of these variables over time and absorb ﬂuctuations
in longevity, fertility rates, life expectancy, salary growth or any other kind of
uncertainty faced by the pension system.
Keywords: ﬁnancial equilibrium, pay-as-you-go, public pensions, optimisation,
reform, risk, Spain.
4.1 Introduction
Public pension systems are usually ﬁnanced on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO)
basis where pensions for retirees are paid by the contributions of the working-
age population. It is well understood that this method of ﬁnancing requires
a balance between the beneﬁts paid to the pensioners and the contributions
made by the active workers.
The decline in fertility rates, the increase in longevity and the current forecasts
for the ageing of the baby-boom generation all point to a substantial increase
1This chapter is based on the paper ‘An alternative pension reform for Spain based on
optimisation techniques’ by Godínez-Olivares & Boado-Penas (2015). Anales del Instituto
de Actuarios Españoles, 3a época, (21) 107-134.
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in the age dependency ratio, and this will raise serious concerns for the sustain-
ability of PAYGO pension systems. This is a worldwide problem, and many
European countries have already carried out some parametric reforms of their
systems in the sense that promises of payment may be reasonably respected.
For example in Italy the normal retirement age has increased from 60 to 65 for
men and from 55 to 60 for women while the indexation of pension payments
has been modiﬁed in order to reduce their rate of increase. Germany has also
introduced penalties for early retirement.2 As stated in Holzmann, Orenstein,
& Rutkowski (2003), countries such as Sweden, Poland, Italy and Latvia have
undertaken some structural reforms by changing the formula to calculate their
initial pension from a Deﬁned Beneﬁt (DB) to a Notional Deﬁned-Contribution
(NDC) pension system.3
In the meantime, some countries, such as, Sweden, Germany and Japan, have
decided to set up an Automatic Balancing Mechanism (ABM). This has been
deﬁned as a set of predetermined measures established by law to be applied
immediately as required according to an indicator that reﬂects the ﬁnancial
health of the system (Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009, 2010)). Its purpose, through
successive application, is to re-establish the ﬁnancial equilibrium of PAYGO
pension systems without the repeated intervention of the legislator. Turner
(2009) found that at least 12 countries have the indexation of beneﬁts linked
to life expectancy or some other kind of automatic adjustment.4
Spain is not an exception to the pension crisis and concerns about the ﬁnan-
cial sustainability of the pension system have driven reforms enacted in recent
2Detailed pension reforms for European countries can be found in Whiteford & Whitehouse
(2006).
3According to Holzmann et al. (2003), many countries, including Egypt, China and Greece,
are seriously considering the introduction of NDCs.
4For more information on ABMs see, for instance, Turner (2007, 2009), Vidal-Meliá et al.
(2009) and OECD (2012).
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years. In 2060, there will be fewer than two people of active-age per retiree
compared to more than three currently while life expectancy at the retirement
age will have increased from 16.5 to 20.8. There are many debates regarding the
eﬀectiveness of the Spanish reforms and lot of researchers, Vidal-Meliá (2014),
De la Fuente & Doménech (2013), state that the 2011 reform that introduced
parametric changes and the commitment to a sustainability factor by 2027 is
not suﬃcient. According to Vidal-Meliá (2014) the 2011 reform preserves the
structure of the pre-reform formula for calculating the initial retirement pen-
sion and reproduces most of its main ﬂaws. Responding to the strong pressures
from the European Commission, the Spanish Committee of Experts designed
and introduced a new indexation on pensions (annual revaluation factor), to
be implemented from the beginning of 2014, and sustainability factor5 (inter-
generational equity factor) for the pension system to be implemented in 2019
with the aim of reducing spending on pensions.
To our knowledge, the Spanish pension system reform does not have any math-
ematical basis other than trying to adapt the system to the demographic sce-
nario, without any proof, based on the general view that indicators, such as
the old-age dependency ratio, expenditure on pensions or life expectancy, will
rise over time. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to twofold. First, it
seeks to design an alternative reform of the Spanish pension system, diﬀerent
to the ones proposed in Act 27/2011 and Act 23/2013, based on optimal strate-
gies, that not only adapts the system to economic and demographic changes
with a mathematical basis but also restores liquidity to the Spanish pension
system through changes in the contribution rate, retirement age and/or in-
dexation of pensions. Secondly, it assesses the reformed Spanish system (Act
5For more information on the new indexation on pensions and sustainability factor see Act
23/2013.
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27/2011) with the focus on its ﬁnancial equilibrium in the long run. These
optimal strategies, which we call Automatic Balancing Mechanisms6, calcu-
late the optimal path of these variables over time and absorb ﬂuctuations in
longevity, fertility rates, life expectancy, salary growth or any other kind of
uncertainty faced by the pension system.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents some data on
the Spanish pension system. The third section describes the main notation,
deﬁnitions and the numerical optimisation method. The fourth section shows
the practical application of this method to the Spanish pension system and
suggests how an ABM should be designed, for both symmetric and asymmetric
cases, to restore liquidity to the system. This section also provides a sensitivity
analysis of the results. The ﬁfth section focuses on the long run and provides
an analysis over a 75-year horizon for the Spanish pension system. The ﬁnal
section concludes. Two appendices present the expressions to calculate the
income from contributions and the expenditure on pensions, and; provide a
detailed description of the formulae to calculate the monthly pension beneﬁt
before and after the Spanish pension reform.
4.2 Brief description of the Spanish pension system
This chapter is focused on the reform of the contributory public social insur-
ance programs run by the State and in particular to the old-age (also called
retirement) contingency.7 The retirement contingency is ﬁnanced by contri-
butions from employees and employers.
6See Appendix D for characteristics of some countries with ABMs in place.
7These programs award beneﬁts to compensate for income no longer earned due to sickness,
accident, family care responsibilities, unemployment, disability, old age or death.
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The key features of the reform are: a) raising the statutory retirement age
from 65 to 67 over the period 2013-2027, b) lengthening the period used to
calculate the base pension8 from 15 to 25 years over the period 2013-2022, c)
increasing the number of contributory years for a full pension from 35 to 379
and d) changing the adjustment factors for anticipating the retirement age and
the incentives for remaining in the labour market.10
At the end of 2013, a reform was passed that establishes a new revaluation
index and regulates the sustainability factor that complements the parametric
changes. Under this reform, from 2014, pensions will be adjusted according
to the performance of variables, such as revenue, expenditure and the number
of pensions. This will replace the former system, in force since 1997, which
linked pensions to the rate of change of the CPI. Moreover, from 2019, starting
pensions will be automatically linked to the increase in life expectancy (the
sustainability factor11).
Table 4.1 presents the main data on the retirement contingency during the last
six years. Consequences of the reform are diﬃcult to value at this ﬁrst stage
given that the reform will be applied gradually until 2027. It can be seen that
the actual number of contributors has been decreasing while the number of
pensioners increases. Thus the number of contributors funding a retirement
pension falls from 3.87 to 2.98 over the last six years. At the same time the
monthly beneﬁt and the life expectancy at retirement age increase and this
worsens the sustainability of the pension system.
8Also called regulating base. For more details of the calculation see Appendix G.
9Other features regarding the early retirement and voluntary work extension can be con-
sulted in Act27/2011.
10For particularities or further explanation regarding the reform, please see the Appendix
G and Act27/2011.
11Examination of the sustainability factor (see Act 23/2013) is beyond the scope of this
chapter whose main aim is to shed some light on how variables such as the contribution
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Table 4.1: Some data for the Spanish Pension System (old-age contingency).
Data \Years 2008 2010 2012 2014
Number of contribu-
tors (in thousands)
19,129.81 17,667.47 16,845.86 16,553.79
Number of retire-
ment pensions (in
thousands)
4,936.84 5,123.88 5,330.20 5,558.96
Contributors/retirement
pension ratio
3.87 3.45 3.16 2.98
Life expectancy at age
65
20 20.6 20.5 20.98
Monthly Average old-
age pension
810.48 883.27 946.32 999.77
According to Act27/2011, the aim of the reform is to meet the enormous
challenge posed by an ageing population and to partially correct the imbal-
ance between contributions made and pensions received. This chapter assesses
whether the main changes in the reform Act27/2011 are justiﬁed from a math-
ematical point of view with the aim to restore the liquidity into the system
in the long run. The next section designs automatic balancing mechanisms
to provide an alternative reform and assess the current reform of the Spanish
pension system on a theoretical basis.
4.3 Liquidity ABMs
In this section two ABMs are built to analyse and restore the liquidity of
the Spanish contributory retirement pension system, which is ﬁnanced by the
PAYGO method. These ABMs are based on the work of Godínez-Olivares,
Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016), in which the objective is to minimise
rate, retirement age and indexation on pensions should be modiﬁed to re-establish liquidity
in the system in the long run.
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changes over time in the main variables, such as the contribution rate, normal
retirement age and indexation of pensions. This mechanism, which uses an
intertemporal optimisation model, identiﬁes and applies an optimal path for
the contribution rate, normal retirement age and indexation of pensions to a
PAYGO system.
The ﬁrst ABM does not include the accumulation or deﬁcit of the buﬀer fund,
while the second includes the accumulation or deﬁcit of the fund over the time.
The aim of both ABMs is to absorb ﬂuctuations in longevity, fertility rates,
life expectancy, salary growth or any other random events in a pension system.
The main purposes of the ABM, through successive applications, are to re-
establish the ﬁnancial equilibrium of PAYGO adapting the system to changes
in socio-economic and demographic conditions; to create a credible institu-
tional framework to increase the likelihood that promises of pension payments
will be respected; and to minimise the use of the pension system as an electoral
tool.12
The functional objective is a logarithmic function which is set to minimise the
percentage of the changes over time of the key variables. The logarithmic func-
tion is widely used in statistical forecasting (Nau (2015)). Its great advantage
is that small changes in the natural log of a variable are directly interpretable
as percentage changes, to a very close approximation, and because changes in
the natural logarithm are (almost) equal to percentage changes in the original
series, it follows that the slope of a trend line ﬁtted to logged data is equal to
the average percentage growth in the original series. Godínez-Olivares, Boado-
Penas, & Pantelous (2016) introduced the idea of minimising the rate change
12Nevertheless the system still is subject to a kind of political risk in the sense that the
planning horizon of politicians is much shorter than the horizon of the pension system.
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of the decision variables involved in the projections of the contribution rate,
normal retirement age and indexation of pensions.
The optimisation problem is deﬁned by the objective function:
f(dn; n) = mincn;x(r)n ;n
h NX
n=1
h
1log
cn+1
cn

+
12log
x(r)n+1
x
(r)
n

+ 23log
n+1
n
ii
(4.1)
where cn is the contribution rate; x(r)n , is the age of normal retirement; and, n,
is the indexation of pensions. i , i = 1; 2; 3 are the weights which measure the
impact that occurs when the key variables are projected and 1 + 2 + 3 = 1.
These weights reﬂect the interest of the policy maker, since, a value of 0 in one
parameter means that no change is allowed in this particular variable.
A metric problem is present due to the nature of the logarithmic function, as
cn, x(r)n and n have diﬀerent units and constraints. To deal with this problem,
i, i = 1; 2 have been introduced in the growth rates of the age of normal
retirement and in the indexation of pensions;
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where c, x(r) and 1 are the maximum increase that are allowed (and 1
for n) per year in the contribution rate cn, the age of normal retirement x(r)n
and the indexation of pensions n; and 1fj2!g is the indicator function.13
The system’s liquidity is measured in two ways; ﬁrst, without the inclusion
of the buﬀer fund, that is, only the income from contributions and the ex-
penditure of pensions are taking into account; and secondly, the accumulation
of the buﬀer fund over time and the actuarial projections of the income from
contributions and the pensions to be paid are included in the liquidity of the
system. The following subsections describe the constraints set in our optimi-
sation model to build the ABMs.
4.3.1 Liquidity ABM without buffer fund
In order built a realistic problem, the following constraints are imposed on
the Liquidity ABM without buﬀer fund; for the contribution rate, cn, the
age of normal retirement, x(r)n , and the indexation of pensions, n, upper
(cmax; x
(r)
max; max 2 <) and lower (cmin; x(r)min; min 2 <) bounds are imposed.
These bounds are set in order to avoid possible unrealistic increases in the key
variables of the pension system. Another constraint to be considered is the
smooth constraint. This constraint is necessary to prevent jumps in the con-
tribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions. Mathematically,
the smooth constraint is set as:
c1  cn+1
cn
 c2; x(r)1 
x
(r)
n+1
x
(r)
n
 x(r)2; 1 
n+1
n
 2;
where c1; c2; x(r)1; x(r)2; 1; 2 2 <.
13The indicator function takes the value of 1 if the condition j 2 ! is satisﬁed and 0 in all
other cases.
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Finally, the liquidity restriction is imposed as: cnWn(n; g; x(r)n )  
Bn(n; g; x
(r)
n ; n)  0. Wn is the total contribution base14 paid at n an Bn is
the total expenditure on pensions at n that depend on the growth of salaries,
g, the retirement age x(r)n , and the indexation of pensions n. The liquidity
restriction helps to impose maximum levels of deﬁcit or surplus into the sys-
tem, and setting this restriction greater or equal to zero means that no deﬁcit
is allowed in the pension system.
The optimisation function to minimise is as follows:
f(dn; n) = mincn;x(r)n ;n
h NX
n=1
h
1log
cn+1
cn

+
12log
x(r)n+1
x
(r)
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
+ 23log
n+1
n
ii
(4.2)
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14See Appendix F for details of calculations for the total contribution base and expenditure
on pensions.
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4.3.2 Liquidity ABM with buffer fund
In this subsection a contingency fund is introduced into the minimisation func-
tion. It is important to highlight that four papers, Godínez-Olivares, Boado-
Penas, & Pantelous (2016), Haberman & Zimbidis (2002b), Pantelous & Zim-
bidis (2008), and Gannon et al. (2013), propose parametric reforms in the
PAYGO pension systems introducing the concept of a liquidity or contingency
fund in order to absorb unexpected events that might aﬀect their liquidity.
Gannon, Legros and Touzé (2013) deﬁne this buﬀer fund as the intertemporal
budget balance of the pension system that brings promised future expenditures
in line with expected future revenues. For example, the interest generated by
the buﬀer fund in Spain covered the shortfall in contributions during 2010
(Vidal-Meliá (2014)).
The liquidity ABM with the buﬀer fund calculates the optimal path for the con-
tribution rate, age of normal retirement and indexation of pensions building an
optimisation problem that is solved by numerical analysis (Godínez-Olivares,
Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016)) including the dynamics of the fund, Fn,
that can be expressed as:
Fn = (1 + Jn)Fn 1 + cnWn(n; g; x(r)n ) Bn(n; g; x(r)n ; n); (4.3)
where Jn is the growth risk-free rate of the fund during year n; cn; x(r)n ; n are
the projected variables during year n; Wn is the total contribution base paid
at n; Bn is the total expenditure on pensions at n. The derived contingency
fund is able to absorb ﬂuctuations in longevity, fertility rates, salary growth
or any other events.
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In this ABM, the liquidity restriction is changed to, Fn  0, that is, (1 +
Jn)Fn 1 + cnWn(n; g; x
(r)
n )  Bn(n; g; x(r)n ; n). The other restrictions set for
the ABM without buﬀer fund remains the same.
The optimisation problem to minimise in the ABM including the buﬀer fund
is deﬁned by:
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FN  0;
The next subsections describe two indicators to measure the liquidity of the
system according to the inclusion or exclusion of the buﬀer fund.
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4.3.3 Liquidity indicators
Two indicators emerge from our model to measure the liquidity of the system.
The ﬁrst one, which does not include the buﬀer fund, is deﬁned by:
INoBF =
cnWn(n; g; x
(r)
n )
Bn(n; g; x
(r)
n ; n)
(4.5)
The second includes the buﬀer fund as follows:
IBF =
(1 + Jn)Fn 1 + cnWn(n; g; x
(r)
n )
Bn(n; g; x
(r)
n ; n)
(4.6)
Both indicators measure the liquidity of the system, however, in the ﬁrst one,
only the income from contributions and the expenditure of pensions are in-
cluded, whereas, in the second one, the accumulated buﬀer fund is added to
the indicator.
4.3.4 Symmetric and asymmetric designs
Our ABM also allows us to design symmetric and asymmetric cases under
both ABMs. Palmer (2013) states that under a symmetric ABM, any surplus
that might arise would be automatically distributed. In the absence of a
symmetric ABM, an undistributed surplus will be maintained. Under the
symmetric design, the ABMs determine whether the contribution rate, the age
of normal retirement and (indexation of pensions) are reduced (increased) when
the system has a surplus or increased (decreased) in periods of deﬁcit (Godínez-
Olivares, Boado-Penas, & Pantelous (2016)). Analytically, for the asymmetric
case the change in the contribution rate and age of normal retirement are
enforced to be strictly greater or equal to zero (strictly lower or equal to zero
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for the indexation of pensions). In other words, under the symmetric case, the
change in the variables could be positive or negative.
The following section shows the application of the ABMs to the Spanish pen-
sion system.
4.4 ABMs for the Spanish pension system
This section presents diﬀerent designs of ABMs for the Spanish pension system.
First, the main data and assumptions are presented, secondly the results are
discussed and ﬁnally this section provides a sensitivity analysis of the results.
4.4.1 Main data and assumptions
Demographic data
According to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica (INE)15) population growth will progressively decrease over the next few
decades. If current demographic trends continue, Spain will lose a more than
million people (2.2%) in the next 15 years and more than 5.6 million (12.1%)
in the next 50 years, continuing the negative trend that began in 2012, hence
the Spanish population will be reduced to 45.8 million in 2024 and to 40.9
million in 2064. The reduction is mainly due to the progressive increase in
deaths and low fertility rates. Figure 4.1 shows the population structure for
years 2014, 2024 and 2034. It can be seen that the largest group in 2014 is
aged 35-39 while the most representative group in 2014 will be the one aged
45-49.
15Instituto Nacional de Estadística, from http://www.ine.es, accessed 1 June 2015.
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Figure 4.1: Spanish population structure.
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The increase in life expectancy also changes the structure of the population.
In fact, life expectancy at birth will be around 84.0 years for men and 88.7 for
women in 2030, 4 and 3 years more respectively from current values. Despite
the decrease in the number of population and an increase in life expectancy,
the number of deaths would continue to grow as a result of population ageing.
In the period 2012-2032 more than six million deaths are expected, around
7% higher than those observed in the previous 15 years (1999-2012), which
results in a decrease in the value of the old-age dependency ratio (Figure 4.2).
Speciﬁcally, in 20 years there will be more than 11 million people over 64 years
in Spain, that is an increase of 34%.
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Figure 4.2: Projected old-age dependency ratio.
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Other main data and assumptions
To set the minimisation problem, some assumptions are needed:
• The entry age into the labour market, xe, is set in 2016.
• At the beginning of the study, the decision variable contribution rate is
assumed to be 18%, that is the weight that represents the expenditure
on pensions over the total contributory expenditure.
• At the beginning of the study, the decision variable retirement age is
assumed to be 65, that is the legal retirement age before the reform.
• At the beginning of the study, the decision variable indexation on pen-
sions is assumed to be 1%. Although pensions are usually linked to the
change of CPI, we want to see how this variable reacts with the economic
and demographic scenario.
16The entry age into the system does not have real implications in our model since we match
the number of contributors and pensioners through the dependency ratio.
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• The upper and lower bounds of the contribution rate, age of normal
retirement and indexation of pensions are 23%, 69 and 2% and 18%, 65
and -2% respectively.17
• In order to have a smooth transition, it is also assumed that the change
over time18 in the contribution rate varies between 0.3% and 0.5%, the
age of normal retirement between 1.5 and 3 months and the indexation
of pensions between -2% and 2%.
• The buﬀer fund is assumed to increase at an annual rate19 of 3% while
the annual salary growth20 is 2%.
• The salary structure is assumed to be the mean annual earnings in Spain
of each age group21.
• The average net replacement rate considered in our analysis is kept22 at
75%. This value is higher than the replacement rate of 68.8% in the
OECD-34. As a result of setting the replacement rate at 75%, the ratio
of the average pension to the average salary in 2014 becomes 60% which
is in line with real data23.
17Negative indexation would be a very unpopular and an unlikely measure to be taken in
Spain. However some PAYGO pension systems like Sweden has already adopted a negative
indexation for some years to make its pension system solvent. For this reason, we would
keep a more general setting in our model allowing for negative indexation with a minimum
value of -2%.
18These values are in line with the most important reforms in the 34 OECDmember countries
between January 2009 and September 2013 (see OECD (2014)).
19Historical average of the Euribor in the last 15 years.
20We assume the expected growth of the GDP in the next 20 years according to European
Commission (2012a).
21Eurostat Database, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat accessed 1 June 2015.
22Sensitivity analysis is provided regarding this variable.
23According to the OECD (2011) the Spanish pension reform on a full career worker re-
duces the replacement rate to 73.9% (on the OECD’s standard assumptions of 2.5% price
inﬂation and 2% real earnings growth).
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4.4.2 Results
Figure 4.3 presents the optimal path for the contribution rate, age of normal
retirement and the indexation of pensions when the buﬀer fund is included.
This ABM, in contrast with the ABM without a buﬀer fund, accumulates
the surpluses of the system. In both symmetric and asymmetric scenarios
the optimal path of the decision variables is the same and the eﬀect of the
inclusion of the fund is seen, particularly, in the levels of the contribution rate,
Figure 4.3a, and age of normal retirement, Figure 4.3b. The contribution rate
stabilises at 20.5% and the age of normal retirement at 67.4. The indexation
of pensions, Figure 4.3c, shows minor changes; with the inclusion of the buﬀer
fund it stabilises at -0.75%. The dynamics of the fund are shown in Figure
4.3d. The accumulation period decreases over the last 5 years of the analysis,
leaving the fund in levels near to zero as imposed in the restrictions.
4.4. ABMs for the Spanish pension system 145
Figure 4.3: Liquidity ABM with buﬀer fund (Black line-Symmetric. Grey line -Asymmetric.
15%
16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
21%
2014 2024 2034
C
n
Year
Symmetric Asymmetric
(a) Contribution
63.0
64.0
65.0
66.0
67.0
68.0
2014 2024 2034
Year
Symmetric Asymmetric
(b) Age
-1.50%
-0.50%
0.50%
1.50%
2014 2024 2034
Year
Symmetric Asymmetric
(c) Indexation of pensions
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2014 2024 2034
F
u
n
d 
  
  
 x
10
00
Year
Symmetric Asymmetric
(d) Fund
To illustrate how the inclusion of the buﬀer fund contributes to the liquidity of
the system, two liquidity indicators for the ABM with buﬀer fund24 are shown
in Figure 4.425. The ﬁrst one, Figure 4.4a, represent the ratio (equation (4.5))
between the income from contributions and the expenditure of pensions, it
is seen that the indicator, from year 2020 -2028, is below 1, so, the income
from contribution does not cover the amount of pensions to be paid during
2014-2020 and 2029-2034. However, when the fund is included in the ratio
24For the ABM without buﬀer fund is not possible to calculate these indicators, because the
optimisation problem does not take into account the accumulation of the surpluses.
25As can be seen, the optimal path is exactly the same for both scenarios.
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(equation (4.6)), Figure 4.4b, the ratio is always above 1. So, the inclusion of
the buﬀer fund is contributing to the liquidity of the system.26
Figure 4.4: Liquidity Indicators for the ABM with buﬀer fund (Black line-Symmetric. Grey
line- Asymmetric).
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If we apply the liquidity ABM without including the buﬀer fund, the pro-
jections of the contribution rate, age of normal retirement and indexation of
pensions for Spain can be seen in Figure 4.5. In both scenarios, the symmet-
ric and asymmetric, the contribution rate, Figure 4.5a, increases from 18% to
21.75%. The age of normal retirement, Figure 4.5b, increases to 68.8; 1.25%
and 1.4 years more respectively compared to the ABM with the buﬀer fund.
The indexation of pensions, Figure 4.5c, shows a small decrease compared to
the previous ABM, in both the symmetric and asymmetric design, down to
-1% by 2034. Figure 4.5d, shows that the liquidity indicator is always greater
than 1, so, the expenditure of pensions is always covered by the income from
contributions, as set in the liquidity restriction.
26Given that the optimal path for the decision variables is the same, results under symmetric
and asymmetric scenarios are identical.
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Figure 4.5: Liquidity ABM without buﬀer fund (Black line-Symmetric. Grey line
-Asymmetric).
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4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
This section presents, for the ABM with buﬀer fund under the asymmetric
scenario, the results of increasing or decreasing the replacement rate (RR);
increasing or decreasing the old-age dependency ratio; and, the results when
only one variable is projected and the other two are ﬁxed in the current values.
In Figure 4.6, two levels of replacement rates are analysed. First, we suppose
a replacement rate of 65% (black points line). Under this scenario, the con-
tribution rate increases only by 1.9% to stabilise at 19.% (0.51% less than in
the base scenario of a replacement rate of 75%); the age of normal retirement
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increases to 66.8 (0.6 years less than in the base scenario) and the indexation
of pensions decreases to -0.55%, that is 0.2% less compared with a replace-
ment rate of 75%. When the replacement rate is set 85%, the contribution
rate stabilises at 21.50%, the age of retirement at 68.5 and the indexation of
pensions at -1.0% (that is, 1% and 1.1 years more, and 0.25% less indexation
of pensions comparing with the scenario under the replacement rate of 75%).
Something interesting in this analysis is the dynamic of the buﬀer fund. For
the replacement rate of 85%, the buﬀer fund has surpluses at the end of the
analysis; however, as we are imposing an asymmetric scenario, the surpluses
cannot be redistributed by the system.
Figure 4.6: Liquidity ABM with buﬀer fund (Black dashed line - RR 85%. Grey line- RR 75%
-base scenario-. Black points line - RR 65%).
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Figure 4.7 shows the results when diﬀerent levels of the old-age dependency
ratio (OD) are taken into account. First, a decrease of the ratio from 2.98
to 2.8 is analysed, then an increase to 3.2 is analysed. In the ﬁrst case, the
contribution rate and indexation of pension stabilises at the same level as in
the base scenario, but the age of retirement stabilises at 67 instead at 67.5.
That is, basically, because the age of retirement aﬀect both, pensioners and
contributors. In the second case, when the old-dependency ratio starts at 3.2,
the contribution rate increase to 21.5%, the age to 67.6 and the indexation
of pensions -0.85%. Again, the asymmetric design is leaving the fund with
surpluses at the end of the study when the old-dependency ratio is 2.8 in the
ﬁrst year of analysis.
Figure 4.7: Liquidity ABM with buﬀer fund (Black dashed line- OD 2.8. Grey line- OD 2.98
-base scenario-. Black points line - OD 3.2).
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The ABMs proposed have the ability to modify only one variable, instead of
modifying the three of them simultaneously. Therefore, we analyse the case
when only one variable is studied. If we set the age of retirement and indexation
of pensions at 65 and 1% respectively, the contribution rate would need to
increase to 30%. If the age of retirement is the only player, having set the
contribution rate and indexation of pensions at values 18% and 1% respectively,
it would need to increase to 72.3. On the contrary, if the indexation of pensions
is the only decision variable, the pension beneﬁts would need to decrease by
-10.3% every year.
4.5 Long run analysis of the Spanish pension system
In contrast, with the previous section, the model calculates the optimal path
of the contribution rate, age of normal retirement, and indexation of pensions
over a 75 year time horizon. Figure 4.8a, presents an increase of 2.9% in the
contribution rate comparing with the 20-year time horizon and the value sta-
bilises at 23.4%. The age of retirement, Figure 4.8b, stabilises at 70.4, that
is three years more than for the 20 years time horizon. The indexation of
pensions, Figure 4.8c, now decreases to -1.5%, that is, double the number
compared to the ABM over the 20 year horizon. Figure 4.8d, shows the dy-
namics of the buﬀer fund, which shows an accumulation period of almost 40
years after which it decreases reaching the value of zero at the end of the 75
years.
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Figure 4.8: Liquidity ABM with buﬀer fund (Grey line Asymmetric) in the long run.
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Figure 4.9 shows the liquidity indicators deﬁned in equation (4.5) (Figure
4.9a), and equation (4.6) (Figure 4.9b). The liquidity indicator without the
buﬀer fund, shows a deﬁcit in the system from 2045 onwards, in contrast to
the indicator with the buﬀer fund, which does not present any deﬁcit in the
75 years.
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Figure 4.9: Liquidity Indicators for the ABM with buﬀer fund (Grey line- Asymmetric) in the
long run.
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Finally, if only one variable is projected at a time, the contribution rate needs
to increase to 47% when the age of retirement and indexation of pensions are
ﬁxed to 65 and 1% respectively; the age of retirement needs to increase from
65 to 79.9 if the contribution rate and indexation of pensions are ﬁxed to 18%
and 1% respectively; and the indexation of pension needs to decrease to -9.2%
when the contribution rate and age of normal retirement are ﬁxed to 18% and
65.
4.6 Conclusions
Restoring the liquidity of a PAYGO pension system is on the agenda for most
governments and Spain is no exception. Even after the 2011 reform, the pen-
sion system’s sustainability in the long run has been widely questioned. This
chapter contributes to the debate on the policies needed to strengthen the pen-
sion system and proposes alternative reforms based on optimisation techniques
to re-establish the liquidity of the Spanish PAYGO pension system without the
repeated intervention of the legislator. The aim of these alternative reforms,
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also called Automatic Balancing Mechanisms (ABMs), is to guide the system
back onto the road to long-term liquidity and at the same time to automate
the measures to be taken, isolating them from the political arena, avoiding any
delay and lack of time perspective.
The ABMs can be designed in diﬀerent ways considering or not in our analysis
the amount of the accumulated buﬀer fund. We show that for the Spanish
pension system the contribution rate stabilises at 20.5% and the age of normal
retirement and indexation of pensions at 67.5 and -0.75% respectively after 20
years. As expected, if the amount of the buﬀer fund is not included in our
analysis, the values for the contribution rate, age of normal retirement and
indexation of pensions are higher (lower for the indexation of pensions) and
stabilise at 21.75%, 68.8 and -1% respectively.
The ABMs proposed have the ability to modify only one variable, instead of
modifying the three of them simultaneously. Therefore, if the contribution rate
is the only player into the system, it would need to increase to 30%, whereas
if the age of retirement is the only variable it would need to increase to 72.3,
questioning then the measures taken by Act27/2011. On the contrary, if the
indexation of pensions is set as the only decision variable, the pension beneﬁts
must decrease by -10.3% every year.
Following some of the ideas of the current Swedish ABM we design a sym-
metric ABM that determines whether the contribution rate, the age of normal
retirement (and indexation of pensions) are reduced (increased) when the sys-
tem has a surplus or increased (decreased) in periods of deﬁcit. Although there
are some diﬀerences in the values of the variables under the symmetric and
asymmetric design during the ﬁrst years, at the end of the analysis both ABMs
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reach similar values for the contribution rate, retirement age and indexation
of pensions.
Some countries like Japan or the USA are concerned about the sustainability
of their system in a 95 or 75-time horizon. The results for the Spanish pension
system if a 75-year time horizon is considered are quite alarming. If the three
decision variables are modiﬁed simultaneously, the contribution rate stabilises
at 23.4, whereas the retirement age needs to increase to 70.4 and the indexation
on pension decreases -1.5% every year.
This chapter questions the adequacy of the current reforms and considers that
the sustainability of the Spanish pension system is not guaranteed in a long
run, unless the structure of population changes dramatically with an increase
in the number of contributors and a decrease in the number of pensioners.
5
Conclusions
In social security reforms there is no only one way to proceed and each country
has developed its own model. However, it is clear that any solution chosen
should meet at least two requirements: ﬁnancial and social viability (Sales-
Sarrapy et al. (1998)). In this thesis, the survivor dividend of the Notional
Deﬁned Contributions is analysed and Automatic Balancing Mechanism are
developed.
In the ﬁrst chapter we show that the survivor dividend can cover an unex-
pected increase in longevity, reﬂected either by a decrease in mortality rates,
an increase in survival probabilities or an increase in life expectancy at the re-
tirement age. We found the mathematical formulas for the maximal mortality
improvement an NDC scheme can cover under diﬀerent scenarios, and applied
them to three diﬀerent case studies.
Then in the second chapter, a new automatic balancing mechanism to restore
liquidity into the system under a nonlinear framework was designed. This ABM
is the result of minimising a chosen logarithmic function and simultaneously
calculating the optimal path for the contribution rate, the retirement age and
the indexation of pensions for the PAYGO system. This method aims to keep
the future changes of the projections for the contribution rate, the normal
retirement age and the indexation of pensions at a minimum level and provide
liquidity into the system.
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In the third chapter, the previous model is extended. Two new ABMs are
developed. The ﬁrst ABM is the result of minimising the diﬀerence in present
value between spending on pensions and income from contributions for the next
75 years taking only into account the initial level of ﬁnancial reserves (buﬀer
fund) and no other deﬁcit or surplus during the analysis. The second ABM
design takes into account the buﬀer fund. This non-zero contingency fund
is acting as a buﬀer, ﬂuctuating deliberately in the short run and absorbing
partially or completely the uncertainty in mortality, fertility rates or other
events. The buﬀer fund could have a positively eﬀect in a pension system. If
the fund is big enough the interests generated even in risk-free assets could be
high to face unexpected changes in the demographic or economic projections.
This ABM will restore the sustainability of a PAYGO minimising the present
value of the buﬀer fund over the next 75 years.
The fourth chapter questions the adequacy of the current reforms and con-
siders that the sustainability of the Spanish pension system is not guaranteed
in a long run, unless the structure of population changes dramatically with
an increase in the number of contributors and a decrease in the number of
pensioners.
The automatic balancing mechanisms presented in this thesis could be an al-
ternative to the traditional parametric reforms of the PAYGO systems around
the world. We show that the contribution rate, age of normal retirement and
indexation of pensions stabilise at the end of the period of analysis and con-
verge to similar values under diﬀerent scenarios in our sensitivity analysis. The
contingency fund absorbs the ﬂuctuation of the demographic patterns and the
economic variables involved.
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Two designs are analysed: the symmetric and the asymmetric one. With the
models presented we can conclude that an ABM not necessarily needs only to
increase the key variables in a pension system, but also under the symmetric
scenario, the fund could redistribute the surpluses to the active workers and
pensioners relaxing the political diﬃculties that the legislators could face when
implementing the reform. On the other hand, the asymmetric scenario allows
the government to accumulate ﬁnancial reserves in case of any unexpected
shocks.
When we ﬁrst establish an ABM of this type, we need to set up the number of
projection variables to be included. The main advantages of a mechanism of
this type is to guide the system back onto the road to long-term solvency and
liquidity and at the same time to automate the measures to be taken, isolating
them from the political arena, avoiding any delay and lack of time perspective.
Another feature of our model, is that the ABMs also allows some ﬂexibility
in the sense that the number of variables to be projected can be changed to
adapt the system to a speciﬁc situation. At the same time, it is also possible
to impose more restrictions to the model to keep, for example, the normal
retirement age or the contribution rate constant during some years, making
the ABM more applicable in practice.
In the same line, further research could be done by seeking to assess whether
a sustainability factor linked to life expectancy is suﬃcient to guarantee the
ﬁnancial stability in the pension system and, considering this sustainability
factor, designs diﬀerent optimal strategies, that involve variables such as the
contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation on pensions, to restore
the long-term ﬁnancial equilibrium of the system. Extension to the model are
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possible by including diﬀerent contingencies in our model, i.e, disability, long
term care and by developing a dynamic optimisation method.
This thesis analysed the Survivor Dividend of a NDC and developed Automatic
Balancing Mechanisms in a DB PAYGO pension system in a deterministic
framework. Further development will include the introduction of a stochastic
framework and techniques such as stochastic dynamic programming, robust-
ness, sensitivity analysis and error bounds.
Planning a smooth sequence of change in the key variables of a pension system
requires involving several aspects at the same time. Nevertheless, the ABMs
presented in this thesis involves most of them, an intertemporal budget pen-
sion constraint (the contingency fund); an objective function that allows us
to forecast the contribution rate, age of retirement and indexation of pensions
without the restrictions that a quadratic loss function has; the ﬂexibility of the
policy maker to choose how many parameters want to include; and ﬁnally, the
possibility of recalibration of the parameters involved the automatic balancing
mechanism.
A
Mortality decrease according to the
Lee-Carter model
We prove Formulas 1.16 and 1.17 from the section “Case 2: Mortality decrease
according to the Lee-Carter model”. By assuming that mortality rates are
observed up to year T , we have
ln
 
^(x;T+1)

= ^x + ^x^T+1
= ln
 
^(x;T )

+ ^x
 
T+1   ^T

= ln
 
^(x;T )

+ ^x;
where  is deﬁned as the general mortality decrease that happens between
year T and T + 1, that is, a measure of mortality improvement. The hat on
the parameters indicates estimated values. More generally, we have
ln
 
^x

= ln
 
^x

+ ^x;
with ^x representing the force of mortality following a general mortality de-
crease of , and ^x the current mortality. Instead of comparing mortality rates
between two diﬀerent years, T and T +1, we compare two mortality scenarios.
Alternatively, we can write
^x = ^x
 
B^x

; (A.1)
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with B^x = e^x . By assuming constant age-speciﬁc mortality rates within
bands of age and time, the following relation holds
x =  ln
 
px

;
with
x+ = x; 0   < 1:
Using this assumption, Formula A.1 becomes
px = [px]
(B^x) :
The total expenditure on pensions following a mortality decrease according
to the Lee–Carter model then becomes
End
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nd
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h
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(B^xe+A+j)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and the total increase in the expenditure the NDC scheme will need to cover
is
End
LC
t   Endt = P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)
h 1X
k=0
kY
j=0

pxe+A+j
(B^xe+A+j)   exe+Ai: (A.3)
The maximal general mortality decrease the system can aﬀord is given by the
highest value of  respecting
h 1X
k=0
kY
j=0

pxe+A+j
(B^xe+A+j)   exe+Ai  Dac(xe+A;t)P nd(xe+A;t) : (A.4)
B
Approximation of the mortality
decrease according to the Lee-Carter
model
We prove Formula 1.18 from the section “Case 2: Mortality decrease according
to the Lee-Carter model” by using the following approximation:
ln
 
x
  ln x  x   x
x
;
which is valid if x and x are close enough to each other. This can be eas-
ily proven using Taylor series. Under such assumption, ^x represents the
percentage of mortality decreaseat age x. It follows that
^x  ^x[1 + ^x]:
By assuming a constant age-speciﬁc mortality rates within bands of age and
time, the survival probability, px, corresponding to a decrease of mortality
following the Lee-Carter model becomes
px  e( ^x(1+^x))
 px(Mx) ;
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with (Mx) = e( ^x^x).
The total expenditure on pensions becomes
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; (B.1)
with (Mx) = (1=(1 + x )). Since (Mx) > 1 for all ages (a decrease in
mortality is equivalent to an increase in survival rate), 1 < x < 0. Formula
B.1 is similar to Formula 1.12. The diﬀerence between the two equations lies
in the discounting interest rate that is used. In both cases, the interest rates
are negative. However, in Formula 1.12 the interest rate is constant over time,
while in Formula B.1 it changes. Formula B.1 can then be written as
ẼndLCt = P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;LC()
where the subscript LC() indicates that the present value is computed with
an interest rate changing over time according to the x parameters of the Lee-
Carter model and a general mortality decrease of . It follows that the total
expenditure increases by
ẼndLCt   Endt = P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)[äxe+A;LC()   (1 + exe+A)]:
In order to ﬁnd the maximal mortality decrease the system can aﬀord, we need
to solve with respect to  the following inequality:
äxe+A;LC()   (1 + exe+A) 
Dac(xe+A;t)
P nd(xe+A;t)
: (B.2)
C
Mortality decrease according to the
Lee-Carter model, with growth of the
salaries and indexation of pensions
With salary and pension growth, Formulas A.2 and A.3 respectively become
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The maximal general mortality decrease the system can aﬀord is represented
by the highest value of 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Finally, the approximation developed in Appendix B can also be applied in a
model including salary and pension growth. Formula (C.1) becomes then
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C. Mortality decrease according to the Lee-Carter model, with growth of the salaries and
indexation of pensions
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with  x = (1+ g)(1+ x )  1 = (1+ g)(1=e( ^x^x))   1. Formula C.4 extends
Formula B.1 to a more general framework, since salary and pension growth are
now included. In both equations, the discounting rate of interest changes over
time. However, the discounting rate of interest  x is not necessarily negative,
contrary to the discounting rate x . Indeed,  x includes the growth of the
salaries, g, which is usually positive. The growth of the salaries can then
counterbalance the eﬀect of x . Formula C.4 can then be written as
ẼndLCt = P nd(xe+A;t)l(xe+A;t)äxe+A;LC(g;); (C.5)
where the subscript LC(g; ) indicates that the present value is computed with
an interest rate changing over time according to the x parameters of the Lee-
Carter model, a general mortality decrease of  and a rate of growth of the
salaries of g. In order to ﬁnd the maximal mortality decrease the system can
aﬀord, we need to solve with respect to  the following inequality:
äxe+A;LC(g;)   ä

xe+A;g
 D
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: (C.6)
D
Automatic balancing mechanisms
This section shows some of the main countries that have an ABM in place.
Many countries have introduced automatic mechanisms, that mainly aﬀect the
pension level, to take into account changes in life expectancy. Other ABMs
are linked to other indicators, such as sustainability or solvency indicator, that
reﬂect the ﬁnancial health of the system.
For a deep understanding see Vidal-Meliá et al. (2009), Fall & Bloch (2014),
Turner (2007), Turner (2009), OECD (2012) and OECD (2014). The list is
sorted alphabetically.
Table D.1: Automatic balancing mechanisms
Country Type Main Characteristic
Canada DB Actuarial projections are carried every 3 years for a time hori-
zon of 75 years, if the plan is not ﬁnancially sustainable a (semi-
automatic) mechanism will be triggered by increasing the contri-
bution rate by the amount necessary to cover 50% of the deﬁcit,
and the beneﬁts are “frozen” for three years.
Finland DB The life expectancy coeﬃcient automatically adjusts the amount
of pensions in payment as longevity increases (or decreases).
France DB &
points
France’s automatic adjustment mechanism operates maintaining a
constant ratio between the duration of activity and the expected
duration of retirement. However, the government has the right
not to make these adjustments if labour market conditions do not
support the extra years of work.
Germany DB The formula for revaluing pensions includes a sustainability factor
that takes into account the system’s rate of dependence.
Italy NDC Italy uses a transformation coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient is reviewed
every three years in line with changes in mortality rates at diﬀerent
ages up to 2019 and every two years after that date. However,
the adjustment is not completely automatic, because it requires
legislative approval.
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Table D.1 – Automatic balancing mechanisms... continued
Country Type Main Characteristic
Japan DB A modiﬁed indexation it is applied to both the revaluation of the
contribution bases and the revaluation of pensions in payment.
It takes into account both improvements in life expectancy and
population increases (or decreases). It could be modiﬁed every
ﬁve years, due to the actuarial report.
Latvia NDC Latvia uses unisex life expectancy at retirement age to convert
the NDC account balance to an annuity. It bases life expectancy
on projected cohort life tables, which are adjusted annually.
Norway NDC The system has unisex life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts at re-
tirement. The life expectancy divisors are determined for each
cohort, based mainly on remaining life expectancy.
Poland NDC Poland uses an annuity divisor which is revised annually. It is
based on average life expectancy at retirement age.
Portugal DB The pension reform includes an indexation to its social security
beneﬁts taking into account improvements in life expectancy. The
reduction of beneﬁts is based directly on the percentage change
in life expectancy.
Sweden NDC The ABM is triggered if a solvency ratio is less than one and it
consists basically of reducing the growth in pension liability, that
is, the pension in paymen and the contributors’ notional accumu-
lated capital.
E
The Gradient Method
Following the general ideas about optimal non-linear optimisation in discrete
time, the Gradient method is used. This is an active set method that works
with inequality constraints. Then, the inequalities are modiﬁed to equality
using a linear slack variable (see Venkataraman (2009)). Finally, the model
and constraint equations are expanded in a Taylor series, and only the ﬁrst
order terms will be retained. Then, with these linear equations, the constraint
equations could be used to reduce the number of independent variables. The
modiﬁed problem is given by minimizing f(D) subject to hk(D) = 0; k =
1; 2; :::; l and Fj(D) + qn+j = 0; j = 1; 2; :::m, dminn  qi  dmaxn ; i = 1; 2; :::; v
and dp+j  0; j = 1; 2; :::m with D = [d1; d2; :::; dN ].
The variable [D] is partitioned in [Z] and [Y], an independent and dependent
set respectively:
[D] =[d1; d2; :::; dv; dp+1; dp+2; :::; dp+m]
T ;
[D] =[Y; Z]T = [z1; z2; :::; zn l; y1; y2; yl+m]T :
Finally, the equality constraint is [H] = [h; g]T .
Deﬁnition E.1. A Generalized Gradient problem with two variables is to
minimize f(Z; Y ) s.t. H(Z; Y ) = 0 and zmini  zi  zmaxi ; i = 1; 2; :::; n   l
and ymint  yt  ymaxt ; t = 1; 2; :::;m+ l, with the linear sub-problem:
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Min ~f(4Z;4Y ) = f(Qi) +rzf(Qi)T 4 Z +ryf(Qi)T 4 Y
s.t. ~Hk(4Z;4Y ) = Hk(Qi) +rzHk(Qi)T 4 Z +ryHk(Qi)T 4 Y = 0;
with 4Z;4Y constrained.
In our problem
f(Z; Y ) = f(dn; n) =
NX
n=1
"
1log

cn+1
cn

+ 12log
 
x
(r)
n+1
x
(r)
n
!
+ 23log

n+1
n
#
;
with dn = [x(r)n ; cn; n].
H(Z; Y ) = 0 is Fn; (dn; n) = 0 and cmax  cn  cmin; x(r)max  x(r)n 
x
(r)
min; max  n  min;n = 1; 2; :::; r   l and c(1)max  c(1)n 
c(1)min; x
(r)
(1)max  x(r)(1)n  x(r)(1)min; (1)max  (1)n  (1)min;n = 1; 2; :::;m + l
with the linear sub-problem as deﬁned above FN  0 is transformed in
FN + qn+j = 0; j = 1; 2; :::m
Finally, with the inequalities constraints for the increase or decrease of the
projected variables, cn+1
cn
 c; x
(r)
n+1
x
(r)
n
 x; we do the same as in the fund’s
constraint adding a variable y(i)j; i = 1; 2; 3; j = 1; 2; :::m such that
cn+1
cn
+
y(1)j = c;
x
(r)
n+1
x
(r)
n
+ y(2)j = x;
Bertsekas demonstrates that feasible direction methods generate sequences of
feasible points fdkg by searching along descents directions.
Deﬁnition E.2. Given a feasible vector d, a feasible direction at d is a
vector d 6= 0 such that d + d is feasible for all  > 0 that are suﬃciently
small.
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Lemma E.1. Stationarity of Limit Points for Feasible Direction Methods.
(Bertsekas (1999)) Let fxkg be a sequence generated by the feasible direction
method xk+1 = xk + kdk. Assume that fdkg is gradient related and that k is
chosen by the limited minimization rule . Then every limit point of fxkg is a
stationary point.
Assuming that H(X i) = 0 we can write
[rzHT1 ;rzHT2 ; : : : ;rzHTl+m]T 4 Z + [ryHT1 ;ryHT2 ; : : : ;ryHTl+m]T 4 Y =
[A]4 Z + [B]4 Y = 0 with 4 Y =  [B] 1[A]4 Z:
Now, doing substitution in the objective function:
~f(4Z) = f(Qi) +rzf(Qi)T 4 Z  ryf(Qi)T [B] 1[A]4 Z
= f(Qi) + [rzf(Qi)T  ryf(Qi)T [B] 1[A]]4 Z
= f(Qi) + [rzf(Qi)  ([B] 1[A])Tryf(Qi)]T 4 Z
= f(Qi) + [GR]
T 4 Z;
where [GR] is the reduced gradient of the function f(Q) and provides the search
direction.
In general, we can not guarantee that the iterations converge to a global mini-
mum unless the objection function obeys signiﬁcant restrictions. For f convex
we have the following theorem; see Bertsekas (1999) for the proof.
Theorem E.1. Optimality Condition
a if d is a local minimum of f over D then 5f(d)0(d  d)  0;8d 2 D:
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b if f is convex over D, then the condition of part (a) is also suﬃcient for
d to minimize over X.
As we have a constraint problem to solve, we need to ﬁnd an optimal vector
d in the closed convex set D; see also Bertsekas (1999).
Theorem E.2. (Projection Theorem): Let D be a non-empty, closed, and
convex subset of <n
a For every z 2 <n, there exists a unique d 2 Q that minimizes jjz   djj
over all d 2 D: This vector is called the projection of z on D and is
denoted by [z]+
b Given some z 2 <n, a vector d 2 Q is equal to the projection [z]+ if and
only if
(z   d)0(d  d)  0; 8d 2 D:
c The mapping f : <nD deﬁned by f(d) = [z]+ is continuous and non-
expansive, that is,
jj[d]+   [y]+jj  jjd  yjj; 8d; y 2 D:
d In the case where D is a subspace, a vector d 2 D is equal to the
projection [z]+ if and only if z   d is orthogonal to d, that is
(z   d)0q = 0;8d 2 D:
As in our case, the function f(dn; n) in equation 2.3 is convex and the set of the
constraints D is close, non-empty and convex, so we can ﬁnd d to minimize
f(dn; n)
171
Algorithm: The Gradient Method
Here, two necessary steps are described in a symbolic way.
Computing step size 
Step 1: Find GR; S =  GR; and choose .
Step 2: j=1.
4Z = S;Z = Zi +4Z;
4Y j =  [B] 1[A]4 Z;
Step 3: Y j+1 = Y j +4Y j .
Qj+1 = [Z;Y j+1]T ,
if [H(Qj+1)] = 0; Stop. Converged.
Else j = j + 1:
4Y j = [B] 1[ H(Qj+1)].
Go to step 3.
Step 4: Do steps 1-3 for 2 values of [1; 2] and calculate f().
With 0 = 0.
Use quadratic interpolation to obtain .
Do steps 1-3 for  to end the iteration.
The main Algorithm
Step 1: Choose Q1; Ns (number of iterations).
Choose  (for convergence and stopping).
Set p=1 (iteration counter).
Step 2: Identify [Z], [Y].
Calculate [A], [B].
Calculate [GR]:
Calculate optimum stepsize .
Calculate Qp+1.
Step 3: Convergence for SQP:
if hk =0, for k=1,2,...l;
if gj= 0, for j=1,2,...m;
if KT condition are satisﬁed.
Converged.
Stop.
Stopping Criteria:
4Q = Qp+1  Qp,
if 4QT 4Q  . Stop,
if p = Ns Stop (maximum iterations reached).
Continue.
p = p+1.
Go to step 2.
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F
Expressions for income from
contributions and expenditure on
pensions
The total contribution base for year 1 is modelled as a function of the individu-
als’ average wage, wage(x) at age x, the number of people alive, lx;1 (uniformly
distributed over the year), at age x at the ﬁrst year of study (that is, at time
1) and the entry age into the labour market, xe. Thus, at time n = 1, the
total contribution base, W1, is modelled as:
W1 =
0@x(r)1  1X
x=xe
lx;1  wage(x)
1A ;
For n > 1, the total contribution base, Wn, depends additionally on variables
such as the growth of salaries, g and the normal retirement age, x(r)n . Where the
ﬂoor function is

x
(r)
n

; i.e., it maps a real number to the largest previous integer
number and mod

x
(r)
n

is the modulus operation that ﬁnds the remainder of
the division x(r)n =

x
(r)
n

. Therefore, the expression of the total contribution
base for n greater than 1 is:
Wn =
0B@

x
(r)
n

 1X
x=xe
(lx;n)  wage(x)  (1 + g)n
1CA
+ (x(r)n mod

x(r)n

)l
x
(r)
n

;n
 wage(x(r)n )(1 + g)n (F.1)
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The dynamics of Bn > 1 could be written as:
Bn =

1  (x(r)n mod

x(r)n

)l
x
(r)
n

;n

 P
x
(r)
n

;n
+
!X
x=

x
(r)
n
Px;nlx;n (F.2)
where Px;n = Px 1;n 1(1+n 1),

x
(r)
n

is the ceiling function, i.e.,

x
(r)
n

maps
a real number to the smallest next integer number, lx;n, is the number of people
alive at age x in time n; w the last age to which a person can survive, and  is
the indexation of pensions that is dynamic over time and the expenditure on
pensions at year n=1 is equal to:
B1 = Px(r)1 ;1
l
x
(r)
1 ;1
+ P
x
(r)
1 +1;1
l
x
(r)
1 +1;1
+ P
x
(r)
1 +2;1
l
x
(r)
1 +2;1
+ ::: =
!X
x=x
(r)
1
Px;1lx;1;
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The Spanish pension reform
In Spain, in order to be eligible to receive a retirement pension it is necessary
to contribute for at least 15 years, including at least two of them in the last 15
years prior your retirement. The ﬁgure G.1 shows the main diﬀerences in the
expression to calculate the amount of the monthly initial pension, pre-reform
(Pxr) and post-reform (P `xr) where:
wagei: is the contribution base of one individual in month i. x(r): is the
retirement age. S1: is the monthly contribution base in month 1, that is, the
month before retirement. Si: is the monthly contribution base in month i.
%x(r);C : is the percentage to be applied to the base1 pension before the reform
according to the retirement age, x(r) , and number of contributory years, C.
(%x(r);C)
`: is the percentage to be applied to the base pension after the reform
according to the retirement age, x(r), and number of contributory years, C.
%C : is the percentage to be applied to the base pension before the reform
according to the total number of years of contributions (C). (%C)` : is the
percentage to be applied to the base pension after the reform according to the
total number of years of contributions (C).
The resulting pension should be higher than the minimum pension per year
and is capped if its value exceeded the amount of the maximum pension.
1The table shows a very simpliﬁed expression of this value without considering the particu-
larities of diﬀerent groups.
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It is worth highlighting that before the reform, one individual who contributes
35 years and retires at the age 65 has a full amount of pension equal to the base
pension. Once that the reform is totally implemented in 2027 the individual
should retire at the age 65 after 38.5 years of contributions or at the age of 67
after 37 contributory year to have full pension.
Figure G.1: Expressions to calculate the pension beneﬁts before and after the reform based on
Act27/2011.
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